Disclaimer: Asymmetrical Haircuts is produced as a podcast, meaning it is meant to be listened to and not read. Because of this, we recommend that you listen to the episode while reading, because the written word does not do justice to the emotion or tone used by our speakers. However, because we recognise there might be bandwidth issues or you might be using a hearing aid, we have provided written transcripts for all our available episodes.

[INTRO MUSIC]

[00:28] Janet:  Hi, it’s Janet here. I’m still alone, unhappily, but Steph will be back soon. Meanwhile, today we are adding a sort of building block to one of our ongoing strands, which is accountability for environmental crimes. This is a really busy field. One of the sponsors where we’re recording today, for example, this is Humanity Hub.It actually has somebody working specifically on climate justice. And that’s a new job that they’ve put in here because there’s just so much going on in this field. There are these big advisory opinions that we’ve covered, like at the International Court of Justice, at the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. And there have been national cases like here in The Netherlands where we had Bonaire, which is a place in The Caribbean, but it’s actually officially part of The Netherlands. And they were taking their own state to court over what was going on with the environmental degradation in Bonaire. So the show notes this time, which I’m going to leave to my producer, Margherita, or maybe to our new member of the team, Sam Maguire, who’s joining us as well. You might see him actually because we’ll take a screenshot of this picture for our website. We’re going to make sure they’re really full of all of the different stuff that we’ve been covering. So if you do a search on climate and the asymmetrical haircuts podcast, you could find all of these different podcasts. 

But after all of that self promotion, I’m just going to say that today, actually what’s going on is what is happening at our kind of our local court, which is the International Criminal Court, the ICC, and whether we might actually see some environmental crimes being prosecuted there. That’s been lobbied for, for as long as I can remember, basically since the court was set up. But as far as I’m aware, has never actually happened. Of course, what we have had and we have covered previously is kind of a sidetrack or a push, let’s say a really important one to amend the Rome Statute, which is the basic document that governs the ICC and to ask whether it could include a fifth environmental crime ecocide. And of course, we’ll link to that episode as well in the show notes. Or here’s a little bit of a drum roll from me. Maybe the lawyers could just use what’s actually there in the Rome Statute currently: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and do the environmental damage via that. That’s what we’re going to discuss today. 

So the reason for this podcast, last December, our producer, Margherita Capacci. Hi, Margherita. {Hi}. She attended a session of the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC here in The Hague. And there, the Office of the Prosecutor launched a how to, a strategy, a very long document. So Margherita, what’s the too long didn’t read? Tell us what’s the headline from that? 

[03:33] Margherita:  What was interesting to me was that at the event, they put a definition to environmental crimes according to this policy, and they explain how they can prosecute damage that is done to the environment, but also damage that is done to people by the means of environmental crimes and how they can prosecute that within the framework of the four existing crimes. And they gave some concrete examples and some challenges. And as you say, we’ve been following environmental crimes and accountability for quite a while. So it was interesting to me to see this new kind of step or new approach, let’s say. 

[04:16] Janet:  Okay. That was longer than I expected, but much more detail than I had expected. And I think maybe we don’t even need to do the podcast. Of course we do. So straight after the event, Margherita grabbed one of the panellists, Laura Baron-Mendoza, and she’s here to explain exactly what is new and why it matters and how it’s going to work. Hi, Laura. 

[04:36] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Hello, everyone. I’m genuinely delighted to join you today. 

[04:40] Janet:  Laura’s a Colombian lawyer and she specialises in international human rights, and she was actually one of the consultants for this policy. So, Laura, what I understand is that even though I can go through the whole Rome Statute with a fine tooth comb and I can look particularly at Article 5, which is the bit that lists the actual crimes that can be prosecuted at the ICC, and I can say, okay, environment doesn’t come up there at all. The strategy though, that you consulted on and that Margherita has just summarised for us, says that under the current crimes, like war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, maybe even aggression, but let’s take the first big three, They could be the basis for charges around environmental damage. So how is it? Just quoting directly from the strategy. Here’s a quote from it. “Committed by means of, or that result in environmental damage”. Let’s start. Have I got that right? Have we got that right? What does that mean? 

Environmental Accountability Avenues in the Rome Statue 

[05:44] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  So let’s get messy legally and intellectually. Let me begin by reframing a little bit the premise, because this is one of the biggest misunderstandings surrounding the ICC’s new policy on addressing environmental damage. So despite the use of the words environmental crimes, the ICC has not created a new category or a new crime. Instead, what the policy does is remind us and operationally guide the office of the prosecutor that the Rome Statute already deals with environmental harm in three different ways. Two of those you mentioned, and the third one ties it all together. 

So the first one, the first scenario is the classic environmental war crime. This is our starting point. So Article 8(2)(b)(iv), it is and remains the only provision in the entire Rome Statute that explicitly protects the natural environment as such. This is the war crime of launching an attack, knowing it will cause widespread long term and severe damage on the environment. So it’s a beautiful idea on paper, but the threshold is so extraordinarily high that for two decades, it has essentially lived in a doctrinal museum untouched. We can say that. And that’s exactly why the OTP realised it needed a broader framework, relying only on this one article made environmental accountability nearly impossible. 

[07:14] Janet:  So how would that work, Laura ? 

[07:17] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  So we do have a second scenario, which includes crimes committed by means of environmental damage. This second scenario is where things get more dynamic. Here, environmental damage becomes the method, the tool, or the mechanism through which a Rome Statute crime is committed. And this is powerful because it transforms environmental harm into evidence. It means investigators, documentors, prosecutors, and judges can consider environmental damage when verifying whether an element of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or aggression is present. So in other words, environmental damage stops being the background scenery and becomes part of the legal and evidentiary analysis itself. 

And we do have the third scenario. So crimes resulting in environmental damage as you rightly put it. And the third scenario flips the lens. Here, environmental harm is not the weapon. It is the consequence. And consequence matters. So environmental destruction becomes contextual information that influences how we understand gravity, the scale, the impact of the crime, prioritization, sentencing, and reparations at some point. So again, no new crime, but a profoundly expanded lens. 

[08:43] Janet: Wow, that’s a lot put in there. I mean, particularly that last part that it’s the effects and therefore that could have an effect on sentencing. And as you say, finally reparations, but should we wind back to, you know you say for two decades, it’s been, you know, in the museum, we haven’t been able to use that. And you say that just because it’s such a high threshold, the way that it’s worded, is the way that it worded, was that kind of copy pasted from somewhere else? And is therefore just the Rome Statute reflective of how everybody thought when it was being drafted, that this is the way it should be? Or have we started seeing the world differently in the last twenty years? I want to understand the process by which we’re now revisiting this. 

[09:38] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  This is such a key question because, of course, the first thing I want to say is that the policy isn’t some sudden pivot or surprise move from the ICC. Perhaps the policy pivot is just the continuation of a process that is started years ago. So back in 2016, the prosecutor signaled that environmental harm mattered for case selection. It wasn’t yet a full framework, but it was a clear message. So it was that when crimes involve destroying ecosystems, exploiting natural resources or disposing communities on their land, the ICC should pay attention. So we saw hints of this environmental lens in practice too. We saw, for example, former Sudanese president Omar al Bashir, who was charged with furthering genocidal policies through poisoning wells and destroying water pumps, though the case hasn’t reached trial. And then the ICC has issued also arrest warrants for serious Russian military officials for attacks on civilian objects and energy infrastructure in Ukraine. So whether environmental harm is explicitly part of the charges remains unclear because the warrants are sealed. But all of this built pressure, legal, political, scientific, until the office essentially said, we need a dedicated, coherent policy that reflects the reality of today’s conflicts, which was not included at first in the early two thousands. So the new policy isn’t a sudden invention. It is the moment when scattered pieces were finally assembled into a structured operational approach. So I would say that it was just the momentum has been trying to be built over the past two decades to reach to today’s moment or peak. 

[11:37] Janet:  Okay. So what is actually new about this policy paper? 

[11:40] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Let me start by saying that for decades, international criminal law tended to treat the environment as a set of separate objects. So a forest here, a river there, a field somewhere else. So this policy sweeps that away. It adopts a much more holistic perspective, one that reflects how scientists describe environmental systems today as interconnected, dynamic, constantly interacting networks. So instead of focusing on isolated features, the policy recognizes that conflict disrupts entire systems, water cycles, food webs, soil health, air quality, species populations, and of course, the services ecosystems provide to all of us. But it also expands how we understand who is harmed. It acknowledged that environmental destruction affects not only human survival, but also nonhuman species. So animals, biodiversity, and the cultural and spiritual relationships communities have with their lands. So it doesn’t create new rights for nature. No. But it does open a space for a much richer understanding of harm across all four crimes in the ICC’s jurisdiction. And this is one of the most groundbreaking parts of the policy because it kind of modernizes the entire evidentiary toolbox. So in the past, documenting environmental harm in conflict was incredibly difficult. You needed scientists, specialized equipment, a long term data, all things that are hard to access in especially war zones. But the new policy tackles that head on. It commits the office to working with environmental scientists, toxicologists, climate specialists, public health experts, hydrologists, satellite analysts, ecological survey teams, and even local and indigenous knowledge holders. It also normalizes using open source intelligence, for example. Often the only feasible way to gather early evidence when boots on the ground aren’t an option. So perhaps the most significant shift in this is that the policy encourages the use of best available science, including indigenous knowledge as such. 

Emerging Ecological Crime Cases 

[14:06] Janet:  Starter for however many dollars you want to put on this, what’s going to be the first case that you see emerging from this new policy? 

[14:16] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  That’s a very tough question because, of course, every single case could have an environmental dimension for sure. But let me say that we can have, for instance, with crimes against humanity, we can have two specific cases. One, Sudan and second, Gaza. So in Sudan, do have that since April 2023, Sudan has seen systematic attacks on water systems. Water has been weaponized in two different ways, perhaps I can say, deliberately by armed troops seizing reservoirs, destroying treatment plants, and cutting water access to major urban centers and displacement camps. And indirectly through the collapse of infrastructure leading to cholera outbreaks, for example, famine conditions and mass displacement. So under the policy, this kind of environmental destruction is no longer just a humanitarian crisis. It can become evidence of crimes against humanity. If it forms part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians, of course. And then Gaza is also an example. So in Gaza, the destruction of wastewater plants, the salinization facilities, farmland and essential ecosystems has created environmental collapse with long term impacts on water access, food systems and public health. And this matters legally because crimes against humanity can be committed through coercive conditions, including those created by environmental degradation or destruction. So if they contribute to displacement, for example, or persecution or other inhuman acts, then we will have a case. And perhaps I can mention the most commented case, which is the Kakhovka Dam destruction in Ukraine in 2023. So this is widely considered the strongest candidate for the ICC’s first environmental war crime case. The dam’s destruction caused massive flooding, long term ecological damage, contamination of water systems, destruction of agricultural land, and the military advantage appears minimal compared to the scale of the harm. But here’s the challenge. Article, again, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) remains a doctrinal labyrinth, as we were saying at the beginning. So the terms wet spray, long term and severe are undefined and the threshold is cumulative. And the intent is notoriously difficult to prove. So even though the Kakhovka is the clearest case we’ve seen, attribution, long term ecological assessments, and legal interpretation remain significant hurdles. So the policy helps. It brings in science, satellite imagery, cumulative impact analysis, but it cannot rewrite the status high bar in this case. 

[17:07] Janet:  And you mentioned that we should see potentially the Office of the Prosecutor consulting with Indigenous leaders and actually understanding the Indigenous perspective, their knowledge of their own environment and what’s actually been going wrong there. Can you imagine where we might see an impact? I mean, you yourself are from Colombia. Is this actually going to make a difference, do you think, to what’s going on for indigenous communities there or maybe somewhere else in Latin America? 

[17:41] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  For sure. For sure. Well, this is where things get exciting, actually, because the ICC’s new policy resonates deeply with what Colombia has already begun to articulate through its transitional justice system. So the policy explicitly acknowledged that environmental harm do not impact all groups equally. It states clearly that the worst effects fall on marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples who are more dependent on and interconnected with their ecosystems. It also highlights that when analyzing environmental crimes, the ICC will emphasize the right, both individual and collective of groups with a particularly close relationship to their natural environment.

But the policy goes further and it takes me back to what we were saying. It recognizes that environmental crimes are complex and require an interdisciplinary approach, including, for example, environmental science, yes, but indigenous knowledge systems. And the policy also commits to rely on diverse sources of evidence that includes testimony and perspectives from indigenous peoples themselves. Something that the special jurisdiction for peace in Colombia has already done. And I can, can share with you one of the clearest examples in Colombia, which is the case O2 in the Agua territory. So one of the clearest examples of how environmental harm intersects with indigenous rights is this case that I just mentioned, which investigates crimes in areas largely inhabited by indigenous peoples such as the Agua, along with Afro Colombian and Campesino communities. So the JEP has already charged former FARC-EP members with environmental destruction as a war crime, recognizing that violence wasn’t only against people, but it was also against the territory itself. And here is something very important because the JEP treated, what was ancestral territory, the Katsa Su, as a victim itself. Something that perhaps we’re not gonna see going as far for the for the OTP, but perhaps it’s just a precedent to start analyzing how we define the concept of victim when indigenous people indigenous peoples will be before the court. So that is legally and symbolically groundbreaking. The findings of this case describe patterns of harm such as deliberate oil spills that contaminated rivers, mangroves, and coastal ecosystems, gold mining operations promoted or controlled by armed groups, destruction of soil, forest, water sources, but also connected to the damage to sacred sites and a space of cultural and spiritual significance, which caused also displacement, killings, and threats used to control natural resources and the territory. So in other words, environmental destruction was not incidental, but it was a method of domination and territorial control. 

[20:52] Janet:  Margherita, would you like to join in? 

Reparations to the Environment 

[20:58] Margherita:  Yeah, a question popped in my mind because I know you said at the start of the conversation that the environment is not going to become a victim in itself. But I was wondering, we have done an episode before about this lagoon in Spain, Mar Menor, and that became like a legal personhood. And that also, I guess, matters when it comes to reparations. So I was wondering what kind of space does the polity create for that, for also reparations not just to the people, but also to the environment and the ecosystem itself? 

[21:39] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  It’s very limited because, of course, it starts with the definition of who is a victim. Right? And for the ICC, humans are the victims. Right? But I do believe that there’s an entry point to start considering, for example, collective reparations when it comes to indigenous peoples here. Or even when it comes to Colombia, we talk about Afro Colombians. And perhaps the JEP could be a good example for the ICC in the future to explore other avenues. And one of the most innovative aspects of this case that I was telling you about case O2 is how the JEP understood territory itself. It didn’t treat territory as land in a property law sense, but it embraced the way many indigenous peoples have said territory is alive. It is social, it is ecological, it is spiritual and relational, and it is not separate from the people. So the people and the territory exist together. So for them, when you say humans and when you say territory, we’re basically talking of this relationship between both of them. So that has enormous legal impacts on the definition of victim preset. And the JEP used what is called a relational ontological approach, which recognizes that the destruction of forests, rivers and sacred spaces is simultaneously the destruction of identity, community structures and cultural continuity. So this approach allowed the JEP to fully grasp the magnitude of the harm and perhaps why not? One day in a couple of years, we will see the OTP also addressing or having the same approach. For now, it’s quite limited. 

[23:26] Janet:  Whenever I hear somebody starting talking about what’s been going on in Colombia at the JEP, the JEP, as you call it. I’m feeling really guilty because we haven’t done a series of podcasts on it yet, but you know, definitely we must do. Wondering also though, in connection maybe with indigenous communities, we’ve been doing a series particularly on corporate crimes. And we looked at some other places in South America and we were wondering whether this policy might lead to more investigations, which could be connected to alleged corporate responsibility, but it couldn’t be corporate responsibility, could it? It would have to be individual criminal responsibility, but what, what do you see potentially happening there? 

[24:20] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Well, let me start by saying, yes, South America is a fascinating region when we talk about corporate responsibility and not just in South America, we also see it all over the globe. Right. But the region is a fascinating, almost emblematic case study of how corporate power, environmental devastation and human rights abuses can intertwine. What the ICC’s new policy does is bring corporate decision makers into a much sharper focus. So it doesn’t change the rule that companies themselves can’t be prosecuted, as you say it, but it absolutely strengthens the possibility that people inside those companies, the executives, the financers, the planners can be held accountable when their choices help produce environmental harm connected to Rome Statute crimes. 

One of the most powerful and perhaps overlooked aspects of the policy is the way it explicitly affirms that corporate actors can be individually criminally responsible. That means if someone in a boardroom authorizes an operation that destroys critical ecosystems or it turns a blind eye to extraction in an area controlled by armed groups or profits from environmental destruction that forcibly, for example, again, displaces communities, that person is not safely insulated by the corporate structure. This is particularly significant in South America, where high risk economic activities like gold mining, oil extraction, agribusiness, cattle expansion and even logging often take place in territories inhabited by indigenous peoples, Afro descendant communities and rural communities. So this new policy gives the ICC a robust framework to examine whether the environmental impacts of these activities intersect with any of the four Roam Statute Crimes. So the ICC already had jurisdiction over individuals, but the policy sharpens the tools needed to investigate and prosecute corporate linked environmental crimes. 

And here’s what perhaps changes in practice. First, corporate officers can be prosecuted, as I was saying, when their decisions contribute to wrong status crimes involving environmental harm. And superior responsibility applies to civilian leaders too, meaning that executive could be held responsible for failing to prevent or stop environmental crimes committed under authority. And the Office of the Prosecutor now has a Financial Investigation Unit, a major step, which allows investigators to trace, for example, supply chains, funding flows and corporate structures behind environmental destructive operations. 

Challenges standing in the way of the ICC policy

[27:21] Janet:  It’s all sounding quite amazing. Let’s be clear, though. What are the challenges to actually making this policy deliver something? What’s standing in the way? 

[27:31] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  A lot. I can start by saying that we have to acknowledge the obvious. The ICC is not a well resourced institution. Environmental investigations are not quick, cheap or simple. They require scientific sampling, long term ecological monitoring, satellite analysis, toxicological studies and teams of experts who can interpret all of that. And these cases are expensive, time consuming and technically complex. So the ICC is already stretched thin with its existing caseload. That I would say is the first challenge. A second challenge perhaps is the dependence on state cooperation. And this is an old challenge, wearing new clothes, basically. The ICC depends on states to cooperate. And let’s be honest, these states where the worst environmental harms occur are often the least enthusiastic about opening their doors to investigators. Sometimes the state is directly implicated. Sometimes the harm happens in areas controlled by armed groups. Sometimes the state just doesn’t want external scrutiny of extractive industries or military operations. So no amount of policy innovation can replace the need for cooperation on the ground. A third challenge, I would say it is geopolitics and jurisdictional gaps. Geopolitics still shapes what the ICC can or cannot touch. So many of the conflicts with catastrophic environmental consequences fall outside the ICC jurisdiction, either because the state isn’t a party of the Rome Statute or because the Security Council would never refer the situation. So even when the jurisdiction exists, political pressure can stall or narrow investigations. The environmental crimes often intersect with powerful political and economic interests. And those interests can make accountability extremely difficult. And perhaps a fourth challenge that we’ve already mentioned is the legal hurdle no one can ignore, which is Article 8(2)(b)(iv). But that’s precisely why the new policy shifts attention away from relying on this one crime. And it recognises that realistic accountability will come through reframing environmental harm within other crimes. 

[30:15] Janet:  I mean, you acknowledge that the ICC is part of a bigger kind of ecosystem and that sometimes that means that there are constraints, but it also means that sometimes other courts can actually take things on. So how do you see this as kind of one piece of the puzzle and that we should also be looking at this sort of in relation to, let’s say, the development of the crime of ecocide elsewhere, what’s going on at the International Court of Justice, the Inter American Court. You know, I’ve got a whole long list of stuff that Margherita’s stuffed in here. How do you think it all fits in here? 

[30:49] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Yes. Let me start by saying that the policy paper is not a magic wand, right? So it is a major step toward making environmental destruction visible as a criminal harm. And I love your question because it reminds us that the ICC new policy is not operating in a vacuum. It’s not a tile in a mosaic. A growing global architecture of environmental accountability. So I would start by saying or mentioning the ecocide movement that you, that you also referred to. This policy is not competing with ecocide efforts and it’s not a substitute for them either. If anything, it’s evidence that the world is moving in the direction that ecocide advocates have been pointing to for years. They need to treat severe environmental destruction as a matter of criminal responsibility. So the initiative to criminalize ecocide at the international level driven by Pacific States, civil society, and increasingly the States themselves is doing essential work by putting nature and planetary stability at the center of legal thinking. But there is still a long road ahead. We need a definition of ecocide that is clear, operational, legally sound and not dependent on vague economic or cost benefit calculations that delude its purpose. So, the ICC’s new policy doesn’t create Ecocide, but it shows why Ecocide is needed. And it works with the law as it currently exists, as you mentioned at the beginning of this conversation. So, while Ecocide pushes for the law we need for the future, the policy works with what we have right now. You mentioned also ICJ, Inter American Court, European Court and other human rights tribunals. So this is perhaps one of the most exciting parts for me as a human rights lawyer, because the Human Rights Court and the ICC are finally speaking to each other expressively. So conceptually, and even if not directly, I would say. So the ICJ, the Inter American Court, the European Court, and even the African regional bodies have been issuing grounding decisions and advisory opinions that recognize environmental protection as a human rights obligation, the climate crisis as a legal challenge, and the responsibility of states to prevent and remedy ecological harm. So these courts are mapping the human rights dimensions of environmental devastation. The ICC, meanwhile, is mapping the criminal dimensions. So put those together and you get a much more complete picture. For example, when the Inter American Court says that environmental degradation violates cultural rights, territorial rights, or even the right to life, the right to a healthy environment, the ICC can look at those same harms in their right circumstances and ask, do these human rights violations also amount to crimes against humanity, perhaps persecution or forcible displacement or other acts within our jurisdiction? So this is the puzzle coming together. Human rights law diagnoses the harm, I would say, and international criminal law can respond when that harm crosses into criminality. 

[34:26] Janet:  You kind of gave an explanation there of how it relates to ecocide and the development of ecocide. I must admit though, that kind of in my brain, I’ve been following the developments over the pressure for ecocide as this fifth crime within the court. And we know that that’s basically not possible because it’s very difficult to get enough States to sign up to anything, anything to change anything in the Rome Statute. So it does seem to say, let’s not change the statute and let’s make the policy instead work. But it also says in your policy that states themselves should be prosecuting ecocide. I mean, isn’t that a little bit hypocritical? 

[35:14] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  I think the policies certainly emerged in the same climate, intellectual, legal and political. And the ICC can’t just decide to create a new crime, as you said. Only state parties can amend the Rome Statute. And for that, you need consensus, you need negotiations, you need drafting, ratification, and also political will at the highest levels. And that process takes years, sometimes decades. So the question becomes, what can the ICC do in the meantime with the law as it exists right now? And that’s exactly what this policy does. It uses the legal tools already in the statute and shows how they can capture environmental harm today without waiting for formal amendments. The policy is not a substitute, but it’s a validation of the need to have a fifth crime, which is ecocide. So, because when the prosecutor says we can use existing crimes to address environmental harm, what the prosecutor is actually saying or is also saying is and we still need more. So the effort to define ecocide led by states, Pacific nations is crucial. But ecocide needs a clear definition that avoids vague economic balancing. So it’s not about clashing initiatives. It’s about complementary initiatives. And the work is ongoing. Stop Ecocide is doing a wonderful job here. And this policy buys time by strengthening accountability before Ecocide becomes part of the statute. 

Asymmetrical Haircuts Questions

[36:53] Janet:  We always round up the podcast, Lara, with a few general questions. And the first one is, is there something that we should have asked you that we haven’t managed to get around to asking you? 

[37:03] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  I think there are a lot of questions. I mean, this policy paper opens a lot of avenues. So for instance, questions about complementarity and cooperation, questions about the next steps, questions about different types of environmental governance and how do they influence the analysis, legal analysis of the Rome Statute crimes. 

[37:29] Janet:  Laura, I’m gonna put you on the spot then. Pick one of all of those. What would you like to answer as your last sort of major additional question? 

[37:40] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Let’s dive into the complementarity question, because complementarity and cooperation is not just part of the model here. It is the model. Capacity will always be a challenge and the ICC isn’t a global police force with unlimited resources. But this strategy here is smart. The ICC isn’t trying to handle everything itself. It’s trying to activate others. So think of the ICC less as the protagonist and more as the conductor coordinating, guiding, supporting and stepping in only when absolutely necessary. So if there is one message running through this policy, it’s that enforcing environmental accountability requires a collective ecosystem of actors, not a single heroic institution. The Rome Statue was built on the principle that states carry the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute international crimes. So, the ICC steps in only when a state can or won’t do so. So, this policy embraces that vision and emphasizes on the positive complementarity. That means the ICC isn’t sitting in The Hague waiting for failure, but it is out there proactively helping states build the capacity to act themselves. So, the policy guides the office of the prosecutor to do more than observe. It can share intelligence and evidence, help design investigative strategies, collaborate in case elections and many more other actions it can carry out. So, many states want to act, but simply don’t have the tools to do so. So, the ICC can help change that a little bit. The policy also clarifies how cooperation works. So it adopts the two track system that the policy on complementarity developed, which is track one partnership and track two vigilance. 

[39:38] Janet:  Margherita, you would like to ask a final question. 

[39:40] Margherita:  This is a more recent question that Steph put in place. You can answer it two ways. So it’s what was your oddest job before you started doing your current job or before you started working in international justice? Or was there a moment that really put you on this path that really sparked your interest in this field? 

[40:04] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Yes. Well, there are two moments that brought me into this field. The first one is the fact of growing up in Colombia, a country that hasn’t seen a single day without armed conflict. And like most Colombian families, mine has lived it in different ways. That personal reality pushed me toward international law. And then once there, I started working directly with victims and former FARC members. That’s when I discovered this incredible complex relationship between conflict and environment. And I saw not only how war harms ecosystems, but also in a strange paradoxical way, how conflict can sometimes end up protecting them, those ecosystems. So it depends on the resources in the territory, local political dynamics, even rebel commanders’ personal ideology. So that’s what led me to my current work on rebel environmental governance. And digging into their relationship with nature and the way that they depended on nature to survive and also to acquire a sense of legitimacy.

[41:16] Janet:  And the final question is, is there something that you’re reading at the moment or listening to or watching that you would like to share with everybody? It can be something that’s in this field or it can be something that’s completely other that you use to get away from this field. 

[40:30] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Yes, I do have a fantastic recommendation. It is The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida. It’s part historical fiction, part supernatural thriller, and completely unforgettable. So, it throws you right into the Sri Lankan civil war in the 1990s. And the whole story unfolds in this afterlife of the main character tries to solve his own murder and decides whether to let go or try to influence the world he left behind. It’s a gem. I assure it. 

[42:05] Janet:   Yeah, great book. Thank you so much. So, Laura, thank you so much for spending time with us this Friday afternoon to actually, you know, go through one of these enormous pieces of work that gets put in at the ICC. And then, you know, I think often people like us wonder what happens next. So I think at least we have some indication now of what we should expect in terms of direction within the court. And to be honest, I mean, I’m quite excited. I think this sounds quite interesting. You know, should be quite good to watch this over the next few years. Will we see you here in The Hague? Do you think sort of trying to kick it into touch? 

[42:47] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  Perhaps, I might let you know whenever I come to The Hague again. 

[42:51] Janet: Right. Thank you so much for your time, Laura. Much appreciated. And thank you, Margherita, for setting this up and for stepping in and being a bit of Steph. 

[43:02] Margherita:  Thank you, Janet, for having me again. And thank you, Laura, so much for joining us. It was really interesting.

[43:04] Laura Baron-Mendoza:  No, thank you so much for having me. It’s been a joy to be the guest in this wonderful, curious, sharp edged podcast universe. And whenever you want to talk about The JEP, let me know. {Will do!}. 

[OUTRO MUSIC]

Stay safe and enjoy your day.