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[INTRO TUNE]

Janet 00:40  All rise. Hi, this is Janet, and we’re continuing our journey today around universal jurisdiction. This month, it’s Belgium. Steph, unfortunately, couldn’t join. So just as a reminder, which would usually be a Stephopedia, to folks out there who might remember this like me, about 20 years ago, Belgium was this kind of big space that everybody thought in the field of accountability, all the campaigners were saying Belgium is going to be the one for universal jurisdiction. But since then, it’s become a relatively minor player, in my view. But maybe I’ll be corrected by the end of this podcast.

Janet 02:03  So why did that happen? Well, there was this broad law in the 1990s, which was known as a, quote, “textbook example of absolute universal jurisdiction,” unquote. So maybe similar to thinking back to the podcast we did on Argentina. And under that, there were some really interesting attempts to bring war crimes charges against some high-profile foreign diplomats. I think I remember Ariel Sharon, one of the Bush presidencies, maybe even Donald Rumsfeld, who was then Secretary of Defence. But then there was this big diplomatic backlash, including US threats to relocate the NATO headquarters away from Brussels. And that led, more than 20 years ago, in 2003, to some amendments which restricted universal jurisdiction to cases with Belgian links or treaty mandates. And this reduced what they knew as, quote unquote, “forum shopping.”

Janet 02:59  But that’s 20 years ago. So what has been happening since? Joining us is Mathias Holvoet, a lecturer in international criminal law at the University of Amsterdam, and he works on the prosecution of international core crimes cases at the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in Belgium. Hi, Mathias.

Mathias Holvoet 03:20  Hello, Janet. Thanks a lot for having me. It’s an honour to be in this great podcast. Thanks a lot.

Janet 03:25  It’s an absolute honour. Thanks. That’s very kind of you. But before we check my homework and see whether I made any sense with my highly journalistic summary just then, I wanted to go through a bit of other news with you first, because this is why Belgium really came into the news during last month, during April. It may not be strictly universal jurisdiction, but I just feel we’d be crazy not to mention it. So this bit of news is about the 93-year-old former Belgian diplomat who’s been ordered by a Brussels court to stand trial for his role in the assassination of the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Patrice Lumumba, in 1961. And that’s even before I was born, so it’s an enormous amount of time ago. This is a war crimes trial against Étienne Davignon. As far as I understand, he’s not accused of directly trigger-pulling, but imprisonment, humiliation, and degrading treatment. So Mathias, take it away. This is such a long time ago, but how did we get here?

Mathias Holvoet 04:34  Well, I think the Davignon case is demonstrating a recent trend in Belgian criminal justice, I would say, where courts also start to look at Belgium’s colonial past. So we had this case related to the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of Congo. We also had a case where a Belgian court declared that the so-called Métis practices, where children of Congolese mothers and Belgian colonial men who were living in Congo were separated from their mothers and put in housing, were crimes against humanity.

Janet 05:06  Métis, just to say in case anybody didn’t hear that, means mixed, in inverted commas. And so the practice sounds very similar to things like Canadian residential schools: this idea of trying to take children away from some kind of “infecting blackness,” totally in inverted commas, and make them quote unquote white. Was that the idea?

Mathias Holvoet 05:25  That was the idea, indeed. So there it’s not a case of individual criminal responsibility. There, the Belgian state was held accountable for crimes against humanity. This practice of separating Métis children from their mothers was declared a crime against humanity. So this was the first example where Belgian courts were willing to declare this as a crime against humanity. I think it’s also one of the first instances in general where colonial crimes are qualified as international crimes, as crimes against humanity. So now we have the Davignon case. I think there were 10 individuals who were identified as responsible for the killing of Lumumba and two other ministers. It’s also important to clarify that it’s not only about the killing of Lumumba, but also two other ministers who were associated with Lumumba. Only Davignon is still alive. Due to civil party complaints that were filed with the federal prosecutor by descendants of Lumumba — I think it’s grandchildren who are involved — the federal prosecutor took this step to try to refer this case to the court. Last month, indeed, Davignon was referred to the Brussels Court of Justice for war crimes. So it’s not related to the murder specifically, but more to, as you said, inhumane treatment, the denial of the right to a fair trial, and also illegal detention.

Janet 07:01  To me, it feels like this guy is 93 years old, and we’ve seen plenty of examples of older defendants going on trial, so that’s not so much the issue. But it feels very much like several people were identified and he’s basically the last man standing.

Mathias Holvoet 07:14  Yeah, basically he’s the only man who’s still alive who could be held accountable. At the time, he was a diplomat in Congo. He was only 27 years old, but he was responsible for helping to transfer Lumumba and the other ministers to Katanga, which was a hostile province of Congo, hostile to the Lumumba government. And there, Lumumba was then killed. So he was indeed the only person still alive, the last man standing, who could be prosecuted.

Janet 07:46  Quick update from us on that: what should we expect? Is something going to happen this year, 2026, or will it take a while before we get into an actual trial? What’s your prediction?

Mathias Holvoet 07:58  Well, there is still an appeal by the defence. I think we’ll first have to see what will come out of that. If the appeal is denied, then I could expect a trial to happen by the end of this year. It’s important that it’s before the Brussels Court of First Instance, not a Cour d’assises trial. Normally, all these international core crimes cases go before the Cour d’assises, and this procedure is way more complicated and takes more time. But because it’s referred to the Brussels Court of First Instance, I’m estimating that it could be held by the end of the year.

Janet 08:25  Let’s pick up on some of that stuff about the different kind of courts a bit later on. But first, I did that little summary on this big dramatic shift of 2003, when Belgium went from, “Whoa,” to, “Oh, now, never mind.” Maybe you want to take that up and then explain whether Belgium does universal jurisdiction cases. Does it have a war crimes unit? How does it operate?

Mathias Holvoet 08:46  Yes, very good question. Of course, Belgium was famous in the beginning of the century because of these spectacular cases, but actually there were no cases. There were only arrest warrants. We never had any cases. Then there was a huge diplomatic backlash. Belgium decided to really limit universal jurisdiction. So now, the trials we have are kind of extended forms of active personality, I would say, where mainly the perpetrators who are on trial are residents of Belgium. All the Rwandan cases we had, they were residing mainly in Belgium. We also had a case related to the Guatemalan civil war, and there the victims were four Belgian religious workers who were, at the time, in Guatemala. They were victims of the regime, so there it was passive personality. Basically, those are the main principles that apply. We have, strictly speaking, still universal jurisdiction, but there should be a treaty application which says Belgium has the obligation to investigate and prosecute people who are on our territory. That’s what was invoked last year when these Israeli soldiers were arrested at Tomorrowland. There, I think the legal basis was the Geneva Conventions, which say you have to investigate and prosecute perpetrators who are on your soil. Of course, there was not really a Belgian link there. The crimes didn’t happen here in Belgium. There, the link was strictly speaking universal jurisdiction. But I would say the core is really active personality or passive personality, these extended forms, so residents.

Janet 10:34  You’ve also mentioned that these cases are mainly happening at the Cour d’assises and that they’re often long and complicated. Who’s bringing these cases, then? As I understand it, there isn’t the equivalent of what we have in the Netherlands, the Team Internationale Misdrijven, who are pushing these cases. So who’s doing it?

Mathias Holvoet 10:54  Yes, very good question. I worked myself for two years at the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. They have a section called international humanitarian law. There you have a few federal prosecutors who work on these cases. So we have a section within the federal prosecution that is dealing with organized crime and also terrorism. They’re prosecuting these kinds of cases. But I think the problem in Belgium is that at the police level, which is of course essential, we do not have specialized people. There are some people at the federal police who are investigating these cases, but they’re not really trained to do it. That is the main problem in Belgium: capacity, knowledge, and expertise. There’s a lot of goodwill, because I worked there myself. They’re hardworking people. But what we lack is indeed the Dutch model. I think we should copy it in a way, or at least be inspired by it. That’s why we have a lot of cases stalled in the investigation stage, because the federal prosecution opens a lot of investigations. There is no shortage of cases; there are a lot of potential cases, I would say. But it’s very difficult to get them to trial because there is basically, I think, a lack of evidence.

Janet 12:06  You already mentioned one that got stopped in the investigative stage. That was what’s commonly known as the Tomorrowland case. From my perspective, this was one of the many cases that some of the NGOs involved in pursuing those who may be responsible for some of the destruction in Gaza have brought: individual Israeli soldiers who may have committed war crimes, may have committed crimes against humanity, depending on what can be proved. A particularly important foundation there is the Hind Rajab Foundation, which I’m sure many will have heard of. I believe they have close Belgian ties. But that got stopped in the investigative stage. In your opinion, was this just a political decision to say, “Oi, let’s not touch this,” or, as you might say, was this a lack of evidence?

Mathias Holvoet 13:01  For me, it was a political decision, which is facilitated in a way by the framework we have. What also happened in 2003 is that a lot of power was given to the federal prosecutor to decide which cases he or she will investigate and prosecute. When a victim’s complaint is filed, the prosecutor may say, “Yes, but I think, in my view, there are other courts better placed to do it,” for example, another domestic court or, in this case, the international court.

Janet 13:43  Which international court? What were they talking about?

Mathias Holvoet 13:48  They were saying it was kind of a case of reverse complementarity: because the ICC is investigating and prosecuting the Palestine situation, we refer the case back to the ICC because they’re already investigating and prosecuting. The problem is that you cannot appeal this decision. Of course, you can criticize it in many ways. This is turning around the core idea of the ICC, which is that states have to first investigate and prosecute cases domestically. Especially — and this is also a textbook example, I would say — these are low-level perpetrators. States are meant to investigate and prosecute these. But the problem is that when the federal prosecutor invokes this provision, there is no appeal possible. The Hind Rajab Foundation could not do anything to appeal this. I think it’s a problematic decision. It’s also the result of the backlash in 2003 that we have this provision.

Janet 15:04  Taking some other examples, you’ve already mentioned Rwanda cases, and I’m obviously curious why so many. I assume that’s to do with colonial heritage. I’m also wondering about Syria, Iraq, foreign fighters, and whether there is a lot happening there. Are there investigations and so on? Give us a tour d’horizon. Why don’t you suggest what’s going on in Rwanda and Syria, and maybe the contrast?

Mathias Holvoet 15:30  First of all, why do we have so many Rwandan cases? I think, of course, there are the historical ties, because Rwanda was also a colony of Belgium. We have quite a huge Rwandan diaspora, and of course quite some perpetrators are residing on our territory. So that’s an important reason why we have these cases prosecuted, and many of them because of the historical link. Secondly, I think it’s also about evidence. If you can get cooperation from the Kagame government — because it’s of course mainly Hutu perpetrators — it’s important to get evidence. I think there is cooperation with the Rwandan government, important cooperation to obtain evidence and to go on sites. These are the two main reasons: the historical reason, but also the fact that there is cooperation on these cases from the Rwandan government. Also, maybe the role Belgium played during the genocide: some Belgian soldiers were killed. For the killings of these Belgian soldiers, some people were investigated and prosecuted. So that also plays a role. The fact that we left Rwanda then, and then after that the genocide further unfolded, also played a role maybe. There are still trials to come around Rwandan perpetrators in the years to come. There are a few in the pipeline, from what I’ve read.

Mathias Holvoet 17:00  When it comes to Syria and Iraq, the foreign fighters cases, we had quite a lot of cases, but in the beginning, many of those were prosecuted as terrorist crimes. Why? I think partly there’s also an institutional reason. Belgium had terrorist attacks, so we had quite a focus on terrorism expertise. The choice was more like: we have more expertise and knowledge about these terrorist crimes. That’s also why they were investigated and prosecuted as such. Also, in terms of evidence, it’s easier to establish a conviction for terrorism because it’s evidently less burdensome. You have to establish fewer elements. The contextual elements you don’t have to establish; for example, intent to destroy is always very challenging. So even though those crimes could also be qualified as international crimes, I think they were mainly prosecuted as terrorist crimes. Now, I think we see a bit of a shift lately, where Syrian and Iraqi crimes are being investigated and prosecuted as core international crimes. We had a conviction in absentia for genocide of a foreign terrorist fighter who was with Islamic State for the genocide against the Yazidis. So I think there’s a bit of a shift happening there, where these crimes are also being prosecuted as core international crimes. Why is this? I think this also has to do with cooperation, international and European cooperation, because, for example, the Yazidi case I was talking about is also part of a joint investigation team happening in Sweden and France. I think the evidence collected there as part of the joint investigation team — the idea is that we will prosecute it as core international crimes. We identify which foreign fighters were responsible, and then we prosecute them in France, Sweden, and Belgium as core international crimes. I think in the future, Syrian and Iraqi cases will also be prosecuted more as core international crimes. There are also a few cases in the pipeline.

Janet 19:15  There’s one case that I’m going to be watching, I think, during this year. That’s the Martina Johnson case. This is about Liberia. Where’s Stephopedia when I need her? I mean, she’s not here, so I’m going to have to do it myself. You can correct me if I’m wrong, Mathias. She’s the first Liberian woman to ever be tried for international crimes. It was the Swiss NGO Civitas Maxima that really pushed this investigation. Martina Johnson has been resident in Belgium since 2003, but the investigation started only in 2012. Then she was arrested in 2014 on suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is related to her role in the early 1990s during a thing called Operation Octopus. This was the siege of Monrovia, Liberia’s capital. This was Charles Taylor’s rebels trying to take over Monrovia, which I don’t think worked at that point. An estimated 3,000 civilians were killed during a short period there. She’s alleged to have been a frontline commander. But running through those different dates — investigation since 2012, arrest in 2014, and here we are in 2026, when something apparently is going on — what the hell? Why has it taken so long, Mathias?

Mathias Holvoet 20:37  There are two sides to the story. One side is, again, the Belgian capacity, the resources we have to deal with these cases, and, as I want to reiterate again, at the investigatory level. There is not enough personnel available to deal with all these cases. So there’s the Belgian side, but there’s also the Liberian side. I think, for a long time, they were not allowing foreign investigators on their territory to carry out on-site investigations. So that, of course, slowed down the investigation. Then Corona happened, and nothing happened at all. More recently, there has been another government in Liberia that has been more open to foreign investigators coming to Liberia and investigating those crimes. That’s also why, for a long time, I think this investigation was stalled. And again, as I said, at the Belgian level there are so many cases to be prosecuted and investigated, but there are only three federal prosecutors who also have to deal with other ordinary crimes. That is a problem: the lack of expertise at the police level to be able to more effectively and more quickly investigate those crimes.

Janet 21:54  And what should we expect to happen now? What stage are we at?

Mathias Holvoet 22:00  The case has been referred recently, I think last month, to the Cour d’assises. It’s happening in Ghent, not in Brussels. Most of the cases related to core international crimes are in front of the Cour d’assises in Brussels, but this one is in Ghent. I would expect that there would be a trial maybe by the end of the year or early next year. Then we’ll have to see, because a lot of witnesses have died in the meantime, whether this case will still be strong enough to lead to a conviction. The defence has criticized the fact that the case is not strong enough, witnesses have died, there’s a lot of hearsay evidence. How concrete is it? Of course, we will see what happens, but the question is whether the case is still strong enough to lead to conviction.

Janet 22:49  We’ve run through quite a few different aspects of what’s been going on in Belgium. There’s a bit of a red line through everything you say as well: capacity is an issue. But would you also say that we are likely to see more cases? Is the appetite actually building within Belgium to do more cases? Is there pressure? Do people want to see more cases that Belgium takes on? What’s your prediction?

Mathias Holvoet 23:27  Like I said, there is no shortage of cases. Last year, in 2025, there were 90 or something investigations opened, so it is really a record. Also, for example, because the migration authorities refer more and more cases to the federal prosecutor. They say, “We have a case here where we denied asylum, and we think there might be some probability that international crimes have been committed.” More and more, if you read the last yearly report of the federal prosecutor, they cry out what I said: lack of personnel, lack of police. So I think there’s a lot of willingness at that level. But the important level, of course, is the political level, and that’s always a problem in Belgium. The Ministry of Justice is asking for more money politically. We need more money, but Belgium is already in quite a bad economic situation in terms of budget deficits. I’m a bit pessimistic about whether we will see more cases. There will be a few cases, maybe two every year, but I fear that in the long run, I’m not very optimistic that we will see this institutional change, where we will have more personnel and more specialized investigators. I hope I will be wrong, but this has already been said for years and years, that we need more personnel. Also, we need to get rid of this assises procedure because it’s way too complex and we need lay judges. This has been said already for years and years, and I do not see any change. So I think we will have cases. We will have Martina Johnson, we will have some Rwandan cases, maybe we’ll have some cases related to Syria and Iraq. But for the rest, I feel the situation will remain the same.

Janet 25:22  You kind of opened a bit of a rabbit hole there. You also mentioned it right near the top of the podcast, the complexity of the Cour d’assises and the procedure there. Could you elucidate that for us? What do you mean there?

Mathias Holvoet 25:40  In general, it’s quite a complex procedure because, of course, you have to constitute a lay jury. That always takes time. It’s not like being in front of three professional judges. That procedure is cumbersome. It takes time to make the lay jury acquainted with the complexity of the case and the crimes that are charged. The problem is, and you can read this in the yearly reports of the federal prosecutor, that only a few cases a year can be tried because this procedure is so complex and because there is a backlog, especially in Brussels, to hold trials before the Cour d’assises. That’s why they can only hold, like I said, two or three trials a year. This is different if it happens in other cities, like in Ghent, where the Martina Johnson case will happen. There is less of a problem there, because most of these cases related to international crimes are in Brussels. That creates a backlog. Also, the trials themselves are complex and cumbersome because of the whole procedure. You have to constitute the lay jury and deal with their absences. It takes time. Most of the time it takes a few months.

Janet 26:47  We always wrap up the podcast with a few general questions. The first one is always: is there something that you wish you’d had a chance to say that you haven’t had a chance to say yet?

Mathias Holvoet 26:59  I’ve sounded a bit too pessimistic, but I also want to commend the work of the federal prosecutors and people who work there, because I’ve worked there myself and they’re really committed, and things do happen. I mentioned the Guatemala case, which was also a case from the beginning of the 80s, also extremely complex. They had this prosecuted, and there was a conviction also in absentia. A trial was made possible. So I also want to highlight the good examples. I know the complexity of these cases. They happened many years ago outside of Belgium, so I understand the complexity. But I think it’s a pity that the money is not better used and that the resources are not better used to have a more effective unit for the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. As I said, and as you also mentioned, the Dutch model would be a good thing to look at. There’s a lot of goodwill and a lot of hard work behind it, so I don’t want to sound too pessimistic because it’s also not fair to the people involved. I think there’s a problem at the political level, that there is not enough investment in these cases. Belgium diplomatically is always very much in favour of multilateralism and the ICC. In practice, the investment is lacking. That’s a pity.

Janet 28:24  Yeah, I understand the instinct not to throw your former colleagues under the bus there and to temper your critique. So we will definitely keep some of that in the edit. The second question that we try to ask is some sense of how you got to where you are. Did you have an absolutely straightforward career route, or was it really wibbly wobbly through lots of other choices along the way? Did you have a really strange job before you ended up with this one?

Mathias Holvoet 29:04  I was always very interested in international criminal law.

Janet 29:07  Oh, you’re so boring, Mathias. Come on, you should have been a circus juggler or something.

Mathias Holvoet 29:13  No, so yeah, maybe I should have made Belgian beer or something.

Janet 29:18  No, you just drink it, I assume.

Mathias Holvoet 29:21  Yes, yes. No, it’s true, it’s a bit boring. But I was a law student and I was just interested in international criminal law, and I didn’t like tax law or anything else. I always liked international and criminal law. But that’s not to mean that I never thought about another life. For example, I like music, I wanted to become a DJ. I like sports, I wanted to become a cyclist. But I think intellectually it’s still my strongest point, I will say it like that. Intellectual labour is still my best, where I can contribute the best to society.

Janet 29:53  Just to say that if you are enjoying this podcast and you’d like to give us a bit of extra support, you can head over to our Support Us page where you can give us a tip, or you can follow us on Patreon, and you can download our newsletter. We really appreciate everybody who gives us a bit of extra support there. And our final question is always: is there something you’ve been reading, listening to, or watching recently that you’d like to recommend to others? It can be something in the field or something you use to completely get away from this.

Mathias Holvoet 30:29  Okay, it’s a book in Dutch, but it’s about Yugoslavia. I’ve recently read a history of Yugoslavia. Very fascinating. I want to recommend it to people who read Dutch. It’s Yugoslavia — so in Dutch, Joegoslavië — by Johan de Boose, which is very interesting: the history of Yugoslavia and how we ended up where we are now. I’m also personally connected to the region, so that’s also why it’s maybe more interesting for me, because my partner is from Kosovo. If you like history, I would warmly recommend it.

Janet 30:53  Great. I think I will strongly recommend that to Steph when she’s back on the pod, because she is both Dutch and someone who spent her time in the former — because it no longer exists — Yugoslavia regularly. She enjoys speaking what is now known as BCS, but when she was learning it, I think it was Serbian. So she will definitely enjoy reading that. So thank you very much.

Mathias Holvoet 31:12  I’m learning Albanian myself.  

Janet 31:15  Yes. I don’t think you’ll be able to communicate in that mutual language, but I’m sure in Dutch and English you will be able to. Mathias, thank you very much for spending the time today as part of our series on universal jurisdiction, and speak to you again soon.

Mathias Holvoet 31:22  Thanks again.

 [OUTRO MUSIC]

This was asymmetrical haircuts, your international justice podcast, created and presented by Janet Anderson and Stephanie van den Berg. This episode was created in partnership with Justiceinfo.net,  an independent site covering justice efforts for mass violence, and with the Hague Humanity Hub. You can find show notes and everything about the podcast on asymmetricalhaircuts.com. This show is available on every major podcast service, so please subscribe, give us a rating and spread the word.