Disclaimer: Asymmetrical Haircuts is produced as a podcast, meaning it is meant to be listened to and not read. Because of this, we recommend that you listen to the episode while reading, because the written word does not do justice to the emotion or tone used by our speakers. However, because we recognise there might be bandwidth issues or you might be using a hearing aid, we have provided written transcripts for all our available episodes.

[INTRO MUSIC]

Audio Clip: 00:00  Basically, we have silence, which is not so unexpected when it comes to Serbia and its politics in the government. Usually, when the big deals are happening, it’s either complete silence or denial. Justice plays an important role. I consider this tribunal a false tribunal and indictments false indictments. Such abhorrent crimes must not go unpunished. Proceedings will be long and complex.

Stephanie: 00:29  All rise. Welcome to Asymmetrical Haircuts, I’m Stephanie van den Berg.

Janet: 00:37  And I’m Janet Anderson. And today we’re going back to one of my favourite topics, the ICTY, or to be more precise, now the residual mechanism dealing with the last bits of prosecution of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia after the ICTY formally shut down in 2017.

Janet: 00:53  Yeah, and we’re recording the day after what I think, not sure, was the very last first instance verdict by this court. That’s the Stanisic and Simatovic trial. And it’s actually a retrial because these guys were originally acquitted in 2013. So I think we really need a Stephapedia. So who are these guys, Steph?

Stephanie: 01:13  So the guys on trial that we had a verdict for yesterday was Jovica Stanisic, the former head of the Serbian state security, so secret service, and his subordinate Franko Frenki Simatovic. They were first indicted in 2003. And then after 10 years of trial, they were acquitted. In 2015, appeals judges ordered a retrial. And the prosecution had tried to prove that they were part of a joint criminal enterprise whose aim was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs in large parts of Croatia and Bosnia in the period from 1991 to 1995, covering the duration of the wars in those countries. They faced charges of persecution, murder, forcible transport, deportation, torture. And this was all about that they had kind of bankrolled, organized, set up, and kind of prosecutors started to say that they controlled also various paramilitary groups by Serbs, most famously Arkans Tigers, the Scorpions, and the Red Berets. Those are all names that come past very regularly at the ICTY. And yesterday, they were found guilty of aiding and abetting crimes, but only in one municipality in Bosnia. So all the other charges were thrown out, and they were eventually convicted on five counts and sentenced to 12 years in prison. Prosecution had asked for life sentence. They didn’t get that. And if you look at the time they have served, I think it’s five years for Stanisic and about eight years for Simatovic. With the way the tribunal works, they’re probably going to be out and about quite soon, probably Simatovic really, really soon, and Stanisic maybe a little longer. This seems like a kind of compromise verdict that is supposed to maybe make everybody happy, but I’m sure that it actually hasn’t.

Janet: 02:57  I’ve seen a few comments to that end on Twitter. So to explore this trial and help us understand what happens now with accountability for war crimes in Serbia or by Serbians, we have one of our most recurring guests, Iva Vukusic, who’s a historian and a lecturer at the University of Utrecht. Hi, Iva.

Iva Vukusic: 03:18  Hi, ladies. Hello.

Stephanie: 03:19  And we are also joined by Marija Ristic, who is the regional director of the Balkans Investigative Reporting Network. Hi, Marija.

Marija Ristic: 03:26  Hi, everyone.

Stephanie: 03:27  Marija’s joining us from the family home in Montenegro. So if there is cats, kids or parents walking by, we’ll probably hear something in the background. But that’s how we roll on this podcast. Family life is welcome.

Janet: 03:40  So let’s start with you, Iva. You’re getting a bit of a reputation, aren’t you? I saw that some people have been saying that you’d already actually predicted this sentence, the 12 years. It’s like a previous sentence for the nationalist politician Šešelj. So why did you think that it would be likely to be this kind of length and type of sentence?

Iva Vukusic: 03:58  Well, I think some of my reputation also has to do with the fact that I predicted the dissent in the Mladic case being the way it would be, where, of course, the presiding judge disagreed with much of the content of the case. I think some predictions can be made by informed observers, because through the years, as you follow trials, you become aware of, you know, what judges are like and sort of what kind of evidence is, you know, is trusted. And so I think to a certain extent, if you just follow proceedings with a lot of attention, you can guess. I thought to myself from the beginning, of course, when the prosecution asked for life sentences, that that was not going to happen, because it’s actually quite rare that life sentences are given. So I thought it was going to be something kind of on the lower end. Now, I think it’s very difficult. Of course, we don’t have crystal balls, but I thought it would be somewhere in the space between 10 and 20 years. And that sort of ended up happening, of course, on the lower end towards the 10.

Stephanie: 04:53  Yeah. And you saw that Stanisic’s lawyer, Wayne Jordash, basically called this a cynical compromise, saying that the court really, because his client had been on trial for 18 years, and they had to retrial, that it really, there was no way where the judges would actually be able to come back with a not guilty verdict that would just make the institution look bad. And he felt, or he implied, that the judges were pressured from within the institution to at least have something to convict him on. He also said that he would appeal.

Iva Vukusic: 05:20  I think that’s a good point. Of course, we can’t know what kind of pressures go on within institutions, but it would have been really quite high drama had they come out yesterday and acquitted. Because, of course, this has been going on for 18 years. So, you know, that would have been really a big deal. And also when it comes to this, the length of the process, I think it’s really important that we emphasize that that’s not right. It doesn’t matter who is on the bench and what kind of a case it is. I think it’s really not right, and it’s not good for international justice to last this long. And as for what Mr. Jordash was saying, we don’t know if internal pressures happened or not. But the very fact that you can raise that as a question is not good, if you know what I mean. The very fact that we can ask ourselves this raises certain questions about fairness of this lengthy proceeding. So I think that’s a fair point.

Janet: 06:10  Marija, I wanted to ask you how this is going down in Serbia. I mean, are people talking about this? Are they sort of processing the idea that this is defining in some way what the role that Serbia played in the Croatian and Bosnia wars, or are they ignoring it?

Marija Ristic: 06:30  Yeah. So basically, we have silence, which is not so unexpected when it comes to Serbia and its politics in the government. Usually when the big deals are happening, it’s either complete silence or denial. In a way for Stanisic and Simatovic, I expected if the verdict is a guilty one, that we will have silence simply because opening up this question would actually bring much more than the verdict itself, because the verdict itself is quite vague. And I think only people who quite follow the trial can actually understand why, for example, Bosanski Samac and not any other place or etc. However, people like Arkan who are mentioned or people like Šešelj who are mentioned, they are quite dominant in Serbian public life and the story about Arkan’s Tigers, etc. That’s still quite present in the daily discussion. So I think it was a strategic choice not to talk about this topic, simply not to enter into this area. Stanisic and Simatovic themselves, they were in Serbia before they were provisionally released. So in a way, they were already there. But continuously, I think even from the 90s, there was some kind of secrecy around them. They are obviously the bosses of the secret service, but they were in general not so present in the public. So this was quite an easy way out for the Serbian government.

Stephanie: 08:04  And Iva, if we look at this sentence, there’s a 12-year sentence. They also look like much lesser fish than, for example, Ratko Mladic, who we just saw had his life sentence confirmed on appeal. What makes this particular trial kind of so important for understanding the dynamics of the wars in the former Yugoslavia?

Iva Vukusic: 08:26  Well, at least the way the prosecution argued it is that there was a group of people around Slobodan Milosevic for informal and informal positions of power, and that they, in concert with local Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, planned and implemented the war, so had certain political and territorial goals and worked towards them in cooperation. The prosecution was also alleging that a part of this sort of political project, the way it was implemented, a key element to that were the paramilitary. So the Arkans Tigers, the so-called Red Berets, the Scorpions. It was also, of course, thought by many experts that this is the case that links Belgrade to the local Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because, of course, so far, the overwhelming majority of these convictions that concern, for example, crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, people who were convicted were Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic, Mladic, and a whole array of sort of local and municipal leaders, party leaders and local Serbs. So this link is really what made this trial special. This is something that was also the subject of the Milosevic trial. But as we know, Milosevic died before we found out what the judges thought of that. So these links, basically, the support and the direction that local Serbs had from Belgrade. Many scholars, for example, argue that local Serbs wouldn’t be able to fight a war for a week had it not been for the material and financial support from Belgrade. So this link is actually what was key about this trial. And this very narrow, narrow finding is something that I find fascinating. It’s just one municipality, one sort of set of crimes that it comes down to. And I found that actually quite surprising. I wonder why this municipality and not another one. But we have to, of course, wait for the judgment to read the details.

Stephanie: 10:19  I’m going to jump in and say what I read in the detail. I think the reason why they chose this one municipality, the only thing that sets it apart from all the others is that they have a direct link with that the one kind of paramilitary organizations allegedly set up by Stanisic and Simatovic themselves, the Red Berets, Frankism and the unit.

Iva Vukusic: 10:40  And they arrived by helicopter and there was a direct link to some of the crimes that took place. But yet the summary is not very clear. So I think we’re going to have to wait for the judgment.

Stephanie: 10:50  Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Marija, if you see the Mladic trial, the Mladic verdict was widely discussed in Serbia. I think even Informer printed the entire dissenting opinion, which is probably more attention than they’ve ever given to a case in The Hague before. Could you see this Stanisic and Simatovic case maybe also being used as a kind of nationalist propaganda tool? Like, you know, Serbia couldn’t be linked to, I don’t know, Arkan’s Tigers or the Scorpions or see this whole story isn’t true? Or is it just this case is just never going to get the attention they want?

Marija Ristic: 11:25  I think it’s the reason why it will not get the same attention because the defendants are different, like their personalities and their roles were quite different. Like Ratko Mladic is perceived by a lot of people as someone who is a hero or who helped establish Republika Srpska as it is. So in a way, he is quite seen and known by many. So I assume that if you would go on a street today in Belgrade and ask people, do you know who Ratko Mladic is? I think most of the people would say yes. And he was also often used and referenced by our president himself during political career. If you recall, he also named a street after Ratko Mladic when he was arrested. So in a way, Ratko Mladic is part of the mainstream narrative in Serbia. While Stanisic and Simatovic are known people, so to say, to the older guard, both of journalists and politicians, they were known in the public more or less 15 to 20 years ago. But now, in general, the public doesn’t know who they are. As I said previously, people would probably know more about the paramilitary units itself for the similar reasons as Mladic, simply because they were seen as defenders of the Serbian people. People, for example, in Serbian narrative, what is interesting is, for example, that if there were no Arkan Tigers, Bjelina, a town in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would not be in the hands of Serbs, for example. They considered Arkan Tigers as a unit that saved the city from the Muslims. So I doubt that even if we get on the appeal, the conviction confirmed, that this will cause any kind of waves as it was for Mladic. What would be interesting, I think, later is if we would have some kind of follow-up cases, either on reparations or on local level, that would actually bring some other people to justice. So I think maybe follow-up would probably make a difference, but the verdict itself, I doubt that it would make a significant change in the general public.

Janet: 13:46  I want to come back to you at some point later, Marija, to talk about what might happen locally if we could ever see anything. But first, just one phrase that kind of stood out from the presiding judge, Burton Hall. He said something along the lines of, it’s not our jobs to actually write the history of what happened in the former Yugoslavia. That’s for historians. This is just about individual responsibility. Here he is.

Audio Clip: 14:14  At the outset, the trial chamber notes that it was presented with extensive evidence on the historical context and political developments forming the backdrop of the conflict that enveloped the former Yugoslavia from 1990 through 1995. While it has thoroughly considered such evidence, the trial chamber does not see it as its task as writing the definitive history of the disillusion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Identifying the historical scars, defining the complex political and socio-economic reasons, the turbulent processes of political transformation, the diverging political agendas, and the people’s hopes and aspirations that accompany the dissolution of a state must be left to historians. The task before this trial chamber is very specific. It is to ascertain whether the accused incur individual criminal responsibility for the murder, deportation, forcible transfer, and persecution as charged in the indictment.

Janet: 15:34  So, what do you make of that, Marija? Is this how we understand the history of what happened? Or is it just a trial?

Marija Ristic: 15:43  I think it’s not definitely just a trial. And I think this is something that ICTY has been trying to say in the last couple of years, that these are just trials. While at the beginning, we had this whole story that the ICTY is quite a historic institution, setting up the historical records, etc. So, I, in a way, think that these verdicts are actually most important simply because of that. And even if you read summary, why I think this verdict is important, although it’s in a way disappointing, is simply because it sets some records straight. In a way, it explains the whole reasoning around the war. And it explains paramilitaries, the structure, how they were deployed, what was the role of the Serbian Secret Service. And I assume that once we get the whole judgment, we will see their references to the concrete people, to the concrete evidence, to the concrete contextual events. And that’s definitely something that for me, as a journalist, is quite important. And that later, as historians, people could basically follow up. But probably Iva is a better person to follow up on the history element of this.

Janet: 16:59  I was just going to say, Iva, historian, what do you say?

Iva Vukusic: 17:03  This has been a really interesting discussion for many years now, sort of what is the purpose of the trial? What are the limits of these kind of proceedings? I think here, absolutely, I agree with what Marija was saying, that it’s a bit of a cop-out to say that we only, only, only deal with these individuals and we say absolutely nothing about the rest of the history, because these trials cannot be conducted. These are political crimes. They cannot be conducted in a vacuum. You have to talk about the political project if you want to talk about the paramilitaries or any other perpetrators within them. That said, I do understand that I think fundamentally the purpose, strictly speaking, of a criminal trial is narrow. Has this person done Act A against Law B, and we have Evidence C, and then we make our determinations according to that. And of course, even the summary of the judgment says, if there is another kind of understanding, you have to acquit, because it’s beyond a reasonable doubt. It has to be the only explanation. That’s not the rules that I abide by as a historian. I have to, you know, there’s a different, it’s just a different kind of a way of thinking about things, I suppose. So, you know, on the one hand, it is true that it is, you know, a technical process, but at the same time, it has to say something about the history if it wants to be relIvant and be able to explain the purpose, you know, of the conviction and all of that. But I think in relation to the judgment, I absolutely agree there’s references, but as we, I think, all know, this trial has been more closed, held behind closed doors much more than any other. So I expect the judgment is going to be full of redactions, like, just like the other one, and just like many of the evidence and much of the sort of evidence and also other documents from this trial, a lot of it is redacted and confidential. So to a certain extent, our ability as the public to figure out what, quote unquote, really went on is limited, but because we don’t see things, we can’t read statements, we can’t see documents. So I would like to kind of take this opportunity to put some pressure on these institutions, not only the ICTY, but also elsewhere. Evidence should, whenever possible, be made available to researchers for us to really understand what went on in certain places.

Stephanie: 19:14  Do you think, and we’ve had this discussion a lot, but is an international criminal trial kind of fit for purpose to determine state responsibility? This has been a kind of shadow trial of Milošević, who was very, very prominent in the closing arguments, and Milošević was behind everyone, and these people were Milošević’s right-hand men, so they should be found guilty, was basically the prosecution’s story. Now we have a verdict that doesn’t even mention Milošević. The summary doesn’t mention. There’s Karadžić, there’s some referral to Serbian political, military, and police leadership being involved in the criminal plan. That’s it. I find that very strange.

Iva Vukusic: 19:56  But I mean, again, I’m not a lawyer, you know, so maybe some of this misunderstanding just comes from that. But from a trial that featured extensively mentions of Goran Hadžić, Mihajl Kertes, you know, other individuals from this milieu, so to say, there’s no one. I was reading, I was like, where is everyone? Why don’t we see these names? So again, it’s just something that I find quite unusual.

Marija Ristic: 20:18  I also expected Milošević in the summary, but for me, what is important is that they actually mentioned the Serbian institution they represented, which was an official institution and still is just by the other name. So if you have a top leadership of a state institution, then it’s obviously that they use state resources to commit certain crimes. So in a way, I also find that quite clear in terms of responsibility of the certain state institutions in commission of the crimes or aiding and abetting of the crimes.

Stephanie: 20:59  When you have this verdict, which is such a narrow outcome, and this idea that the tribunal itself propagates that you can find kind of truth through legislation, which, you know, I know you have your thoughts about, do you think it hurts truth finding in this case by having this kind of expectation of the trial that it will establish this link, and then the kind of criminal trial can’t really live up to it? And then people can just say, oh, you see, there was no link because they weren’t convicted. You can have a very simplistic narrative that boost revisionism and hurt truth finding.

Iva Vukusic: 21:36  I think to a certain extent, it’s understandable that we look to the courtroom for so many different functions, but I don’t think it’s the right thing to do to look exclusively to courtrooms to find truth. You know, I think what we can find is facts and hard evidence and transcripts and statements and documents, but I don’t think that, you know, that it begins and ends with a courtroom. Historical findings are complex and multi-layered, and no one is stopping dozens and dozens and dozens of historians to look at the same material and have discussions about what went on and who was responsible and what are the consequences and these kinds of questions. So I think here the courtroom is one player, even one privileged player, because it could be that some of the narratives that are broadly known are formed through these interpretations. But at the same time, I think we have to remember most people don’t read judgments. They don’t read even summaries. A lot of these quote-unquote opinions are extremely superficial. So I don’t even think that it’s that crucial in that regard. You know, the tribunal comes out with a narrative, their understanding, and not even the tribunal, it’s this specific trial chamber. A different trial chamber may have said different things. So I think that’s an important thing to keep in mind. It’s just one part, just one role that is to play in this creation of dynamic narratives that are contested and competing.

Janet: 23:03  Marija, you mentioned already just briefly the idea that maybe there are further trials to be had in Serbia, maybe even reparations for victims. I don’t know myself what’s going on at the moment. My only impression is not a lot. Is there much happening? I mean, what are the prospects?

Marija Ristic: 23:23  So at the moment, there are not so many trials, actually, in Serbia. It’s quite empty, so to say, in the courtroom, if you follow that. And I was a reporter from the trial, and I now know when some of my colleagues are coming back from the courtroom, those are usually quite small trials with one or two defendants. And I recall 10 years ago, for example, you had cases with 10 to 15 people. And the reason is simply because there is no attention and pressure to do that in Serbia, because the whole dealing with the past and prosecution in general of the war crimes in Serbia was, in a way, impulse. So it was never a genuine effort coming from the inside. It was always pressure coming from the outside. And as soon as the pressure, in a way, Ivaded or stopped to be so intense, then the trials itself actually started to be quite small and happening just on a technical level, usually cases taken from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not so many actually own cases by the Serbian war crimes prosecution. For example, for Kosovo, it’s quite interesting that we didn’t have any big case in the last five years. However, I think this trial would be quite important potentially for the reparation cases before Serbian courts. We had, for example, previously a case for the crimes in Podujevo, where we had a criminal verdict where they convicted police officers for the crime. And then after that, we had a separate civil case issued by or started by the victims that at the end resulted in the fact that the court ruled that Serbia needs to pay reparation to the victims in Kosovo. So for me, for example, this would be quite important, in a way, a landmark option. If we get basically confirmation of this case, then the victims of Bosanski Samac and maybe some other municipalities could actually submit a separate civil case in Serbia and possibly get reparations.

Janet: 25:39  And I thought there was quite a narrative with the ICTY itself, and then its follow on institution, that there was pressure for cooperation between the different prosecution units in different parts of the former Yugoslavia, that they were all meant to be, looking for themselves, but also exchanging information with each other. Is that happening?

Marija Ristic: 26:04  So that was the idea. And it started, I think now almost a decade ago. But unfortunately, now there is no political will. And I hate using this term, but at the end, it’s the one that actually captures everything. It’s quite political, the exchange itself, also it shouldn’t be. But unfortunately, war crimes and prosecution around it are still quite sensitive issue. So basically, even there is a basic collaboration between prosecutors, that’s not on a level that we expect. Basically, they would often exchange evidence in smaller cases. But then when it comes to big shots, there is absolutely ignorance and refusal to prosecute that. And in the case of Serbia, which I think is quite dramatic, you have a lot of war criminals convicted in other countries, who are safe from prosecution in Serbia. So in that case, the Serbian war crime prosecution decides to ignore the proceedings happening in other countries simply because it’s politically convenient to have these people free in Serbia.

Stephanie: 27:13  Yeah, I remember when UN prosecutor Bramert spoke to journalists just before the Mladic verdict, he was saying also there are thousands of convicted and at least indicted war criminals in other jurisdictions that are hiding in Serbia, or not hiding, living in Serbia, not being extradited or prosecuted there. And he also said, which I felt interesting, is that Serbia does not note in the national criminal record convictions in The Hague, so that they don’t go on your criminal record, which means that convicted war criminals can still run for office, where he made the, I think, if you steal something in Serbia, then maybe you cannot be eligible for parliament. But if you are convicted war criminal in The Hague, it’s no problem.

Marija Ristic: 27:57  Yeah, I mean, that is obviously the case for Šešelj, and I think there the law was also clear. So this was just one of interpretations of the law, but there was legal basis actually to, in a way, kick out Šešelj from the parliament. It is just that they decided not to take into account ICTY verdicts. However, Serbia signed collaboration with the ICTY, and ICTY is also part of our legislation also on criminal justice that the Serbian war crimes prosecution has. So in a way, they just decided to ignore that part. But for me, and why I also talk a lot and write about these topics, that’s actually the most disturbing thing, is that we have war criminals walking free, we have convicted people riding a bus, or we have people who actually killed thousands in Srebrenica, running for political office, holding different educational events in different schools, etc. So for me, that’s like on a society level, something that is quite disturbing and personally disturbs me as someone who is from Serbia.

Janet: 29:11  Iva, I’m just gonna pull us back to the actual case to Stanisic Simatovic again, because it’s your special subject, isn’t it? Paramilitaries. We even did a podcast with you, all just about all your research into paramilitaries. And I know that you’ve seen the full judgment, so to see the detail. But I’m wondering whether you’re questioning in your mind, whether you’re seeing how difficult it is with a judgment like this to establish responsibility at a distance, you know, who told who what? I mean, is that what we should learn, maybe from this kind of a judgment?

Iva Vukusic: 29:53  I think contemporary warfare in many ways includes irregular armed forces. So units that are not army, regular police, much warfare happens by states sort of outsourcing violence to some kind of murky units or private actors like Wagner, for example, we’ve been reading about this sort of Russian conglomerate of different kinds of units in different places in the world. So I think for international justice and for domestic systems as well, it’s really crucial to understand these intricate relationships that are dynamic and diverse between states and various actors in the field. I think what my research has found for the former Yugoslavia is that even though paramilitaries are often spoken to kind of in bulk, that there was actually quite a lot of difference between them, how they were established, what they were doing, what kind of violence they would engage in. So they were quite different in that regard. My sense also is that the ambiguity of these kinds of relationships is at least to a large extent purposeful. So it’s not sort of a bug, it’s a feature, they are designed in ways to confuse. So this ambiguity and this murkiness, I think in many cases is by design. Again, I think it’s really important if we want to achieve justice in cases where this kind of outsourcing of violence takes place, that it’s really important that we understand what these relationships look like. And also, I think one can say that this kind of plausible deniability and outsourcing of violence seems to work quite well, because we don’t see a lot of cases where these across the border, where there’s no clear chains of command kinds of cases, we don’t see a lot of that. We don’t see indictments, we don’t see convictions. And I think that’s going to mean that states are going to use it because it works. So it’s really important to figure out as much as possible how these intricate relationships work. And I think again, one of the first steps is to have access to as much archival material as is possible.

Janet: 31:55  Thank you very much. We are at the end of the podcast. And so we go to our asymmetrical haircuts questions. But you have a lot of time to jump on your special hobby horses, because always one of our first questions is, what did we not ask? Or what did you still want to say about this topic that we haven’t asked you about? And I’m going to give Marija the first go with that.

Marija Ristic: 32:20  That’s a difficult one. But I think probably the most, for me, the most important part or the most important element is what we will do with this verdict after or with the whole ICTY in general. And for me, that’s I think, the challenge for all of us that are working or were working in this area for such a long time. So what we will do with these trials after they end, and whether there is just an interest for the trials while they’re happening. And I think here we can look, for example, into Germany and some other countries where the trials actually had a life after. And after the trial happened, actually, the real reconning and dealing with the past, because you had historians, journalists, academia, looking into archive also on memorial level. So for me, the work actually should not end now with the trials or the buzz around the trials should not end once we have this verdict in the not the ICTY, the UN mechanism now. And so for me, probably, that’s one of the biggest challenges ahead of all of us.

Janet: 33:44  Iva, I’m sure you want to add something to the archive too.

Iva Vukusic: 33:48  I’m sorry, I’m really becoming like, you know, like a one trick pony. But that’s I think that’s really for me, that’s very important. But no, to return to what I think I should have said, or haven’t been asked, or whatever. For me, one really, really big lesson here is that if international justice is to be viable, as I think all of us here, and many of our listeners want international justice to be viable, it needs to be more efficient than this. It’s not right to have two people on trial for 18 years is going to be 20. By the time it’s done, it’s not right for the survivors. It’s not right for Stanisic Simatovic. It’s not right for anyone. So I really think this should be a lesson to try to figure out in terms of process design and institutional design, how to make sure that international justice is more efficient than this.

Stephanie: 34:34  And another question that we try to put to people, and sometimes they have an answer, sometimes not. So it’s up to you. Is there something that you’d like to share with us that you have changed your mind about over the years, you’ve been working this area, something that maybe you got wrong earlier in your career that now you think, ah, actually, it’s like this. Instead, I see you nodding your head. Iva, what would you like to share?

Iva Vukusic: 34:59  If I think about it, I think one lesson for me is that I try not to feel very strongly about any of it. At least for me personally, when I look back, I don’t know, 15 years back or so, I think sometimes feeling things too strongly may cloud my judgment. And I think as a historian, I always now really try to have a certain distance to whatever outcome and try to see it sort of more clearly in that regard. I think that would be my lesson.

Stephanie: 35:27  What about you, Marija? Are you also zen?

Marija Ristic: 35:30  Yeah. So for me, the most important thing I learned is to manage my expectations. So when I started following trials, I expected that the trials will resolve a lot of things. And if the acquittals take place, that it’s also not at the end of the world. Now I learned first to expect less from the trials, to realize that there is some other work that needs to be done. And I think a lot of people who are working in this area in former Yugoslavia learned the same as me. And the most important part is also that it’s not the end of the world if the trial is not as the one that we expected. There are many other venues of justice that we need to look into. And that also we, in a way, in former Yugoslavia should not be so judgmental and demanding from the ICTY because we often don’t look into the other conflicts. And I often now think, for example, about Syria and other conflicts when people will absolutely not see something like ICTY in the near future. So in a way, although I’m often quite critical, I’m also sometimes grateful that we had an opportunity to have so many criminal justice mechanisms.

Janet: 36:55  Now, Iva, the last time we asked you what you were reading or listening to, you were deep into your PhD and were only reading about paramilitaries 24-7.

Iva Vukusic: 37:03  That is pretty much still the case.

Janet: 37:08  Any particular book that you recommend about paramilitaries?

Iva Vukusic: 37:12  Well, actually, I was reading not long ago, this book that came out, it’s called Drunk on Genocide by Edward Westerman. It’s about the Holocaust and the use of alcohol. But actually, I was also coming back to this classic, Susan Sontag, regarding the pain of others. This is a classic, I’m considering it for a course I’m teaching in the fall. So I guess I do step out a little bit out of the paramilitaries, but as you see, not very far. So I think just my reading tastes, you know, that’s it. And this just doesn’t seem to be changing.

Stephanie: 37:41  Iva, I’m absolutely sure though, that you have a Netflix recommendation for us, though, because I do know that you watch Netflix occasionally.

Iva Vukusic: 37:49  I do, I do. One of the things that I would recommend is the Vietnam War, the I think 12 part documentary, which I think by Ken Burns, which I think was really excellent. And if people have missed The Devil Next Door about the Demjanjuk case, of course, this is an important case in its own right. But I think it really captures very well important challenges and just bringing these kinds of cases to court. So I would recommend it to anyone who’s interested in war crime trials more generally, The Devil Next Door. And as I said, the Vietnam War.

Stephanie: 38:21  And Marija, can you get us out of perpetrators, genocide, etc? Do you read anything a little bit lighter? Watch anything a little bit lighter? Or are you down the same track?

Marija Ristic: 38:34  Not so much about paramilitaries. Two books I’m reading at the moment. One is actually a classic, but I’m reading it because I’m working on some project around journalists and documentation of war crimes is Misha Glenny and Fall of Yugoslavia. So that’s like for everyone who are into this war, they should do it. This is like a basic book about the whole dissolution. And the other quite interesting book that for now, I think it’s only in German and the Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian. It’s from Sasa Stanisic, who published a book in German. It’s called Herkunft and in Bosnian, it’s Nasledstvo. He’s actually a refugee from Visegrad in Bosnia, and he lives in Germany. And in his book, he speaks about his city and migration and how he deals with memory, family, etc. So it’s quite interesting. It’s new, so I’m really recommending it to everyone to check it out.

Janet: 39:30  I can say for our Dutch listeners that there’s also a Dutch translation that came highly recommended or it’s being translated as we speak because we had another buddy, somebody on the podcast recommended it as well. So I looked before about the translations. Thank you very much for taking the time to talk to us and to share your on-point reading.

Stephanie: 39:53  It’s great when we get double or triple recommendations, then we know that definitely this is a book we’ve all got to read. So thank you both very much for joining us and for filling us in on not only the Stanisic-Simatovic trial ending, but also this bigger picture of what’s been going on in Serbia. Thank you.

Janet: 40:12  Thank you. Bye-bye. Bye-bye.

This podcast was created and presented by Janet Anderson and Stephenie van den Berghe. You can find show notes and additional blogs on asymmetricalhaircuts.com. It is recorded in the Hague Humanity Hub, home to a community of innovators in the field of peace, justice, development and humanitarian action. Music is by audionautix.com and the show is available on every major podcast service. So please subscribe, give us a rating and spread the word.

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