Disclaimer: Asymmetrical Haircuts is produced as a podcast, meaning it is meant to be listened to and not read. Because of this, we recommend that you listen to the episode while reading, because the written word does not do justice to the emotion or tone used by our speakers. However, because we recognise there might be bandwidth issues or you might be using a hearing aid, we have provided written transcripts for all our available episodes.

[INTRO TUNE]

 Asymmetrical haircuts Justice. Update with Janet Anderson and Stephanie Vandenberg in partnership with Justice info.net. 

Janet Anderson 00:00:00  Asymmetrical Haircuts, Justice Update, with Janet Anderson and Stephanie van den Berg. Hi everyone, this is Janet. A shout-out to Steph, who would usually be here, but she can’t be with us today. Instead, we have our producer, Margherita Capacci. Hi, Margherita.

Margherita Capacci 00:00:19  Hi everyone. Hi, Janet. Nice to be here.

Janet Anderson 00:00:22  Margherita has been covering the Kosovo Specialist Chambers for the last few years. Because it doesn’t get all the attention it could, or maybe should, we thought we would focus on a couple of major developments there that will have a big impact back home in Kosovo, and are also really important for anyone following international criminal justice developments.

Janet Anderson 00:00:47  I’m now going to force you into the basic Stefapedia stuff. You’ve got to give us a summary. Over to you.

Margherita Capacci 00:00:56  The Kosovo Specialist Chambers was set up in 2015. It is formally part of the Kosovo judicial system, but it is located in the Netherlands, in The Hague, and it is fully staffed by internationals. That was done outside Kosovo because of worries about witness protection in the Balkan country. So far, we’ve had six cases at the Specialist Chambers: three for war crimes and three for obstruction of the administration of justice, or, as we know it, alleged witness interference. And so far, we’ve had two final judgments, in the Salih Mustafa and Pjetër Shala cases, and both were convicted for war crimes.

Janet Anderson 00:01:35  The biggest case, the one that has had the most international attention, is about war crimes and crimes against humanity. What’s been going on there?

Margherita Capacci 00:01:49  You’re talking about the case against Hashim Thaçi and three co-defendants. That trial started in April 2023, and it’s been huge. It had more than 130 witnesses testifying over more than 220 hearing days, plus written statements by other witnesses. So it’s been very long and very rich.

Janet Anderson 00:02:17  I know it’s impossible to summarize that trial in one little podcast, especially as we’re going to shoehorn in quite a few other issues too. But let’s at least name who’s who. I’ve written them down as I meant to say them, but I think you’re the person who should say who they are, Margherita, because they’re Kosovo names and you’ve been practicing, haven’t you? Go ahead.

Margherita Capacci 00:02:44  “Practicing” is a strong word, but yes, we’ve been hearing them a lot. The four men on trial are Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi. They are charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, including persecution, illegal detention, torture and murder. 

Janet Anderson 00:03:03  All four were high-ranking figures in the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and they all went on to become prominent Kosovo politicians. Thaçi is the best-known name, of course, because he was prime minister, foreign minister and then president in the newly independent Kosovo between 2008 and 2020. He was president when he resigned and came to The Hague to defend himself before the court, and he has essentially been staying in Scheveningen, in the detention unit, since then. Margherita, give us a quick summary of what the prosecution has been arguing in this huge case.

Margherita Capacci 00:03:56  The prosecution argued that the Kosovo Liberation Army had a chain of command and that all of the accused bear individual and command responsibility for the charges. The charges cover the murders of more than 100 people and the abuse of hundreds more in around 50 detention sites in Kosovo and northern Albania.

Janet Anderson 00:04:20  And when are we talking about? When was all this meant to have happened? It was decades ago.

Margherita Capacci 00:04:24  Yes, over 25 years ago now. The charged period runs from March 1998 through September 1999. All of this happened in the context of the 1998–1999 ethnic Albanian war of independence from Serbia, when Milošević was ruling over Kosovo. The war ended with a 78-day campaign of NATO airstrikes against Serbia.

Janet Anderson 00:04:55  That helped bring the fighting to an end and set the path toward Kosovo’s independence. I’m finding more and more that war crimes trials are about periods most people, even people listening to this podcast, might not actually have been alive for. I was alive then, because I’m ancient. What about you, Margherita? Were you around and conscious of Kosovo while it was happening?

Margherita Capacci 00:05:21  I was about one or two years old.

Janet Anderson 00:05:25  Then I don’t think you were paying much attention. So let’s dive into the specific case. So, The way we’re going to do this podcast is that we’ll play a few clips from the prosecution and from the defence, just to give a flavour of the final arguments. Then we’ll move on to another case, the witness interference case, which also started recently. And then we’ll pull back and take a helicopter view, including views from Kosovans themselves about the court. As you can imagine, it’s a court in The Hague, about Kosovo, with no Kosovans on the staff. It’s a really interesting example of justice. So kick us off, Margherita.

Margherita Capacci 00:06:22  There’s a lot to cover. Let’s start with the Specialist Prosecutor, Kimberly West. The war crimes trial came to closing statements in February, and she gave this summary when addressing the judges at the start of the closing statements on February 9.

Kimberly West 00:06:38  This case is about the four accused’s goal to gain and exercise control over all of Kosovo. This determination for power had something standing in the way: people who were deemed to be opponents, those who were or were perceived to be collaborating with Serbian forces or officials or state institutions, or those not supporting the aims or means of the KLA and later the PDK. This often included people associated with the LDK and persons of Serb and Roma ethnicity. In order to achieve their goal, the accused committed crimes against their perceived opponents to take control over Kosovo.

Kimberly West 00:07:30  Your Honours, the prosecution witnesses in this case included many KLA witnesses, other Kosovars from all different walks of life, numerous victims of varying ethnicities and their family members, and some internationals who were present in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. The evidence of all these witnesses, as well as the documentary, video and forensic evidence presented, reveals that these crimes were committed and that the accused bear legal responsibility for them.

Janet Anderson 00:08:06  The prosecutor also made it clear that she felt she was speaking on behalf of victims. She said that bringing and maintaining the case, and keeping witnesses protected, had been a massive uphill struggle.

Kimberly West 00:08:29  I save my eternal gratitude for those who deserve it most: those who have personally taken upon their own shoulders to ensure that the rule of law is delivered to the people of Kosovo. That is, those victims and witnesses who have come to this court to give their testimony. Despite fears, threats and stigma being forced upon witnesses and their families by a limited but vocal group in Kosovo, these witnesses yearned so much for the truth to come out that they nonetheless chose to cooperate with my office and give evidence to this court.

Margherita Capacci 00:09:16  In this trial, prosecutor Kimberly West also made a direct link to alleged witness interference, and that’s a trial we’ll come back to in just a moment.

Kimberly West 00:09:28  Unfortunately, this trial did not escape the longstanding and pervasive climate of intimidation that had been forecast from the start. To the extent that the court must consider it in order to make a fair assessment of witness reliability, it should. Indeed, the evidence before you suggests that at least some of these efforts took place right here in The Hague. Still, the court has before it overwhelming evidence that, for example, the accused were key members of the KLA General Staff well before November 1998, and evidence that the zone commanders took orders from the accused, and not the other way around. Clear efforts made to change, dilute or otherwise influence certain testimony, in particular to the benefit of accused Hashim Thaçi, have been uncovered.

Janet Anderson 00:10:25  We’ve heard some of what the prosecution wanted to say. What about the defence? Can you summarize their arguments, Margherita?

Margherita Capacci 00:10:31  During the closing statements, all four defence teams presented their cases. On the very last day, the accused themselves also took the stand and got their chance to speak to the judges and to the public. I wrote about both the prosecution and defence arguments for Justice Info, and we’ll put links to those articles in the show notes.

Janet Anderson 00:11:02  Let’s be clear: basically, the defence denied all the charges. I think a lot of it comes down to what I would call command responsibility, whether these individuals can really be held responsible for the actions of people on the ground. What would you say if you had to summarize it?

Margherita Capacci 00:11:36  I think that’s exactly the key point. All defence lawyers denied any criminal conduct. They also said that the prosecution failed to bring enough evidence to show that the accused were responsible for the criminal conduct. Most of all, they argued that the KLA was not structured enough for them to have control over subordinates. They also argued that other people had more of a decision-making role. The prosecution says one of the key points is that they were part of a joint criminal enterprise. The defence says there was no criminal enterprise. They were not trying to take control over Kosovo for themselves. They were fighting against Milošević for the freedom of Kosovo. Here is Thaçi’s lawyer, Luka Mišetić, during the closing statements.

Luka Mišetić 00:12:44  There are too many holes in the prosecution case, too many internal inconsistencies, too many illogical arguments, too many unanswered questions, too many international witnesses telling you that Hashim Thaçi is not guilty, too many insider witnesses telling you the same thing, too many documents that are missing, such as illegal orders from Mr Thaçi or proof that he authored communiqués, if the prosecution’s theory were true. There is no connection between Hashim Thaçi and any criminal conduct. This nearly three-year trial was a test of the prosecution, and the prosecution has failed. Mr Thaçi’s presumption of innocence remains. It is time for Hashim Thaçi to go home. We ask that you enter a judgment of acquittal.

Janet Anderson 00:13:36  You were there, Margherita, for some of the key moments when the prosecution and defence were wrapping up. What was it like behind the scenes?

Margherita Capacci 00:13:46  It was really interesting. The closing statements ran from February 9 to 18, and I was there for three of those days: for the prosecution, for the defence, and for the day the accused spoke. It was much busier than usual.

Janet Anderson 00:14:04  I mean, it’s usually empty. The times I’ve been there, it’s just me and whoever I’ve dragged along. So it was full?

Margherita Capacci 00:14:12  It was full. On the very last day, when the accused were due to speak, I got the very last free seat in the public gallery.

Janet Anderson 00:14:24  You’re always on time, Margherita.

Margherita Capacci 00:14:27  Well, they weren’t going to speak until the afternoon, so I took it a bit easier that morning. But yes, it was packed. There were more people outside trying to enter. One of them had a T-shirt with the KLA symbol. There were also lots of media from Kosovo doing live shows for TV and newspapers the whole time, so there clearly seemed to be a lot of attention in Kosovo. There were representatives from embassies in The Hague, including the Albanian and Kosovo embassies, plus other observers and lots of family members of the four accused.

Margherita Capacci 00:15:16  I do have to say, you could feel the tension, especially when the time came for Thaçi and the other three to take the word. When they entered the courtroom, everyone stood up and pressed forward to wave at them. And when they started speaking, it was dead quiet. You could see people wiping their eyes, shedding a tear, and becoming quite tense and emotional. That was the feeling I got.

Janet Anderson 00:15:44  They were obviously addressing the court, because that’s what they were there for. But this was also people back home hearing from these men, people they haven’t heard from directly for such a long time. They were speaking to Kosovo too, saying, “This is my position. This is what I have to say.”

Margherita Capacci 00:16:07  Yes, and that hearing came the day after Kosovo Independence Day. Kosovo celebrated its independence on 17 February, so it was charged in that sense too. The court even took a one-day break because of that. You could hear that they are politicians. They were very secure in what they were saying. They were looking at the judges, but it felt like they were speaking to all Kosovars. That’s how it felt. 

Janet Anderson 00:16:45  When should we expect a verdict in this mammoth case?

Margherita Capacci 00:16:56  The closing arguments ended on February 18. From then, the judges have 90 days to issue a verdict, though they could ask for an extension.

Janet Anderson 00:17:08   So the earliest would be sometime in June, unless there is an extension. We’re going to put that trial to one side for a moment and now look at witness interference. You said there were three such cases going on, but there’s one major one we’re going to focus on. It’s incredible that half of the cases at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers are about witness interference. And what strikes me is that this goes to the heart of why the Chambers were created in the first place: to avoid witness interference, especially after what allegedly happened in the Yugoslav Tribunal and in EULEX. That is why we have the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in The Hague, fully staffed by non-Kosovars. So it’s really the heart of the matter. So give us a quick summary of the intimidation, interference and obstruction cases as a whole.

Margherita Capacci 00:18:35  There have been three obstruction of justice cases at the court. Two of them have already ended. One was several years ago, so the men convicted in that case have already served their sentences. In fact, I’ve seen one of them more than once in the public gallery of the main war crimes trial.

Janet Anderson 00:18:57  I don’t understand that. You mean that somebody who served their sentence is now attending court?

Margherita Capacci 00:19:13  Yes, he’s free now, so he’s following the case from the public gallery.

Janet Anderson 00:19:18  Have you asked him what he thinks about what’s going on?

Margherita Capacci 00:19:21  I haven’t. I think I missed my chance there.

Janet Anderson 00:19:25  That is an interesting set of circumstances. I don’t know what to make of it. So that’s one case. What about the others?

Margherita Capacci 00:19:33  There was another case in 2024 in which three men pleaded guilty. Two of them are still serving their sentences and one is already out. So there is only one administration-of-justice case still ongoing.

Janet Anderson 00:19:53  This is the relatively larger one, I think. Tell us more. Who has been indicted here, and for what?

Margherita Capacci 00:20:06  The remaining case involves Hashim Thaçi again. In November 2024, the pre-trial chamber confirmed the indictment against Thaçi for criminal offences against the administration of justice. He is charged along with former Kosovo Intelligence Agency chief Bashkim Smakaj, former Malisheva mayor Isni Kilaj, former KLA member Fadil Fazliu, and former minister of justice Hajredin Kuçi.

Janet Anderson 00:20:47  What exactly are these five men accused of doing?

Margherita Capacci 00:21:03  According to the indictment, between April and November 2023, during separate unprivileged visits to the detention unit, Hashim Thaçi provided Smakaj, Kilaj, Fazliu and Kuçi with confidential information about prosecution witnesses and instructed them to influence the testimonies of those witnesses. He is also accused of providing details about how to do so. The indictment also alleges that Thaçi coordinated three groups, consisting of the other four accused and additional uncharged individuals, with the aim of interfering with the testimony of prosecution witnesses in the main war crimes trial. One of the most notable examples is that the prosecution says Thaçi provided details on how former KLA chief of staff Bislim Zyrapi should testify. Zyrapi was an important prosecution witness and also key in the defence case and arguments, we have heard his name many times.

Janet Anderson 00:22:23  That cuts right back to what we were saying about the core arguments in the main case: chain of command, who was responsible, who said what to whom, and who can be held responsible for these acts. Zyrapi is a key figure in all of that. I understand the additional interference trial opened at the end of February, with opening statements between February 27 and March 5. Were you there for that one too?

Margherita Capacci 00:23:06  I was not there, I have to admit. But I did do my due diligence. I did my research.

Janet Anderson 00:23:12  That’s okay. We can’t always be in court all the time. What’s your summary of what has happened so far?

Margherita Capacci 00:23:31  All five accused pleaded not guilty again. They had already done so earlier, of course, but this was the actual opening of the trial. As we are recording now, the defence teams still have a few more days. We are recording on March 20. They have until Monday the 23rd to say whether they want to seek a dismissal of charges. If they do, they have until March 25 to file the relevant motions. Then they can decide whether to present a case, and if that happens it will be in April.

Janet Anderson 00:24:08  Let’s hear another snapshot from the start of that trial. Here is Specialist Prosecutor Kimberly West again.

Kimberly West 00:24:18  Hashim Thaçi is charged with repeatedly and systematically attempting to interfere with witness testimony and with violating multiple court orders aimed at protecting confidential witness information. His co-accused are charged with unlawfully participating in these crimes. The conduct of the accused strikes at the very heart of the rule of law and this court itself, which exists within the Kosovo judicial system to ensure independent, fair and secure proceedings. That is why we are here. Whether the accused were successful in their efforts to influence witnesses does not matter. The reason we committed resources to this case is to protect the integrity of the proceedings in case six and to ensure that the world and the Kosovo public understand that anyone who attempts to interfere with the truthful testimony of any witness before this court will be held to account.

Janet Anderson 00:25:24  We also caught up with Ardit Kika, a journalist at Koha Vision TV, who has been following the court very closely. It was nice to speak to him again. I’ve met him before in the Balkans and seen him in The Hague over the last few years. He explained what he thinks of all this, and specifically why the prosecution says it doesn’t really matter whether the attempt to influence witnesses actually succeeded. 

Margherita Capacci 00:26:12  Ardit works for Koha Media, and they published a long piece on the opening of this trial.

Ardit Kika 00:26:21  One interesting thing is that I also read Thaçi’s defence trial brief, and there was a strong argument there that the prosecution did not go where it wanted to go. This is also the biggest case for meddling with the administration of justice. The prosecution probably wanted to prosecute intimidation, but it did not end up doing that. Instead, it charged attempted interference with witnesses. The prosecution did not find evidence that Thaçi ordered the intimidation of witnesses. It found evidence only that he tried to influence witnesses. But only the attempt is charged. There are no charges that he tried to scare them, pay them, or anything like that, while in other cases people were convicted for frightening witnesses or promising them money. Some of those people even admitted guilt.

Ardit Kika 00:27:51  For now, from what we see in the trial briefs, what they did have was legal wiretapping over many months. It seems they got some material from that. You can hear what was whispered there, and thoughts such as telling a witness to emerge as a hero after his hearing, or to improve certain parts of his testimony before coming to court, because the KSC has a system where prosecution witnesses can meet the prosecutor before their testimony and make adjustments or corrections to earlier statements.

Janet Anderson 00:28:50  We also asked Ardit what else caught his eye in the new interference trial. As with similar proceedings at the ICC, these kinds of trials can reveal details about life inside the detention unit and we get to understand how defendants prepare their defence. They also tell us something about how the prosecutor’s office operates, because it is the office investigating the allegations, specifically we get information about whose telephones they were allowed to tap, which is always interesting.

Ardit Kika 00:29:30  What I didn’t know is that Thaçi had a printer in his detention centre. The prosecution alleges that he gave confidential documents to his visitors, and that those documents were later found in the car of, for example, the former director of the intelligence agency. The defence says that evidence was planted in his car, which is interesting too. In other words, it seems possible, but there has to be evidence elsewhere too, except from judicial wiretapping.

Janet Anderson 00:30:23  We also asked Ardit how this trial is seen in Kosovo itself, and what people on the ground thought about it.

Ardit Kika 00:30:31  This court is really special, and we call it Gjykata Speciale, which means “special court,” partly because of the witness cases. Up to now, we have had 10 accused brought before the court on accusations of meddling with justice, and six accused for war crimes and crimes against humanity. So it is a very special court in that sense.

Ardit Kika 00:31:02  Reactions in Kosovo were different. Some people were very surprised. Even some of my colleagues asked me, “How is it possible that Thaçi could be such an amateur as to give instructions to visitors in prison?” That is one kind of reaction. But others were not surprised, because Thaçi is still a political factor in Kosovo. Leaders of the PDK, the party he once led, still go to him in detention for advice. I also met people who said prosecutors were just finding creative ways to launder their failure in the big case. Their argument is that the main case was not so strong, so they had to hit the accused twice.

Janet Anderson 00:32:26  Ardit also explained that to understand these issues, you have to have to understand the reality on the ground in Kosovo. The context there is that It is a small country of about 1.6 million people. Everybody knows everybody else. It is a warm, close-knit society. People live close to one another. And, crucially, those accused in these cases were people with very significant political stature and broader power in society.

Janet Anderson 00:33:09  So who else did we speak to, apart from Ardit, Margherita?

Margherita Capacci 00:33:14  We also spoke to Amer Alija.

Janet Anderson 00:33:16  Who is that?

Margherita Capacci 00:33:18  Amer is a criminal law attorney specializing in war crimes, transitional justice and international criminal law. Since 2012 he has contributed to the Humanitarian Law Center Kosovo. He has worked on high-profile war crimes cases in both local and international courts. I started by asking him how pervasive witness interference is in Kosovo more generally.

Amer Alija 00:33:47  We have three cases before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, but we have dozens of cases before Kosovo courts. The main evidence in these cases is witness testimony. During these 25 or 26 years after the war, there have sometimes been cases where pressure was put publicly on people to testify or not to testify, but in general witnesses testify without pressure in most Kosovo cases. We have open trials. We do not have many protective measures in those cases, and the closed sessions are not closed to the public in the same way, so we can see what is happening. But of course, in Kosovo, Serbia or elsewhere, there will always be people who try to put pressure on witnesses. The institutions then have to try to protect their truthful testimony.

Janet Anderson 00:35:05  Amer also spoke about the issue that you and I have both encountered, Margherita: there were a lot of closed sessions in the main Thaçi trial. That has been a major point of discussion at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. We understand why there are closed sessions, to protect witnesses, but it also affects how people perceive the court. If they cannot follow testimony, they may question whether the process is transparent or trustworthy. Here is Amer on that.

Amer Alija 00:35:45  I have monitored maybe more than 1,000 court sessions for war crimes in UNMIK, EULEX and the ICTY. The difference with the Kosovo Specialist Chambers is that in these war crimes cases we have a big reduction in open witness testimony and a huge number of protective measures. For about 50 percent of prosecution witnesses, we as the public, journalists, lawyers and monitors did not have a chance to listen to their testimony. So it is not professional to give any conclusions about what kind of judgment this trial will produce, because we have limited access to witness testimony and limited access to the material evidence presented during trial.

Amer Alija 00:36:43  So this is one element that’s different. In previous courts in Kosovo, under EULEX and UNMIK, which also dealt with KLA members and other parties involved in the war, we did not have this level of closed session for so many protected witnesses or injured parties. A huge number of these protected witnesses did testify in previous proceedings. If you read the charges against Thaçi and others, you will see many detention centres and injured parties mentioned, and many of those detention centres were already part of previous proceedings in Kosovo.

Janet Anderson 00:37:47 Amer reminds us, as I skimmed over earlier, that the Kosovo Specialist Chambers is only the latest acronym in a long list of international justice mechanisms dealing to tackle with the alleged war crimes in Kosovo.

Amer Alija 00:38:22 First of all, we had the ICTY, established in 1993 and finishing its mandate in 2017. At the same time, we had international missions investigating and judging war crimes in Kosovo. We had the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, from 1999 to 2008, and later the European mission EULEX continuing that work. Of course, these cases are connected with other institutions because they deal with the same topics and the same crimes. In the indictments against Thaçi and others, you can see that some charges are connected with previous trials before the ICTY, before courts in Kosovo, and perhaps also with the influence of Serbian courts. We also have local courts dealing with trials, investigations and witness protection.

Margherita Capacci 00:39:35  What else, in his view, has been different about the Kosovo Specialist Chambers compared with previous set-ups?

Amer Alija 00:39:41  In this court we also have a victims’ office, or victims’ lawyers, who protect the interests of injured parties. We did not have this in the ICTY, and not in most Kosovo cases either. In Kosovo it is legally possible for injured parties to be active during trial, but often they were not represented. In the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, representation of victims’ interests is effectively built into the system.

Amer Alija 00:40:04  A third element that is different from previous courts is that in the Kosovo Specialist Chambers we have, let’s say, a one-sided indictment practice. Only one side is being prosecuted. In previous courts we had cases against both KLA members and Serbian forces. But this court deals only with the Dick Marty report, and so now we see only one side before the court.

Janet Anderson 00:40:54  When discussing Kosovo, sooner or later someone is going to mention the Dick Marty report, and Amer just did. Just to remind listeners, that was the Council of Europe report led by Swiss politician Dick Marty. It was really the trigger that established the perceived need for the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.

Janet Anderson 00:41:27  Margherita, are we nearing the beginning of the end?

Margherita Capacci 00:41:30  The end is in sight. We’re not quite there yet, but because this is a podcast about the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, we do have to ask whether it has done what it was set up to do, and whether it has brought Kosovo any closer to justice and accountability.

Janet Anderson 00:41:48  That is a question we should ask about all courts and tribunals, but it feels especially alive here. And even though we are asking it now, I am sure this will not be the last time we ask it. Still, it is interesting to assess it for now, when the main trials seem to be coming to a close and there is no obvious prospect of new major ones. You asked Ardit whether the Kosovo Specialist Chambers is really managing to deliver justice.

Ardit Kika 00:42:43  One important point is that the court has justified its existence because of these witness cases. But it is a completely different question whether it brings justice and accountability. One important aspect of the Kosovo context is that most of the crimes committed in Kosovo during the conflict were committed by Serbian forces, while most of the people convicted for war crimes in Kosovo are Albanians. That is a big contrast.

Ardit Kika 00:43:23  That is mostly because the international community, through the UN and EULEX, was competent for trials until around 2016. So this feels like injustice to many people. My impression at the end of the big trial is that the prosecution has left the “how” and the “who” of the crimes unanswered, while placing the burden of those crimes on the leading KLA figures. But you have to bear in mind that the KLA was a guerrilla force. It is not the same as the Yugoslav Army or the MUP forces that were prosecuted in former Yugoslavia trials.

Ardit Kika 00:44:05  These things are interconnected. The number of convicted Serbs is about 30 and the number of convicted Albanians is about 40. That is one reason Kosovo has not prosecuted many former KLA members, although there have been some convictions in Kosovo itself. Without addressing this, and without Serbia recognizing Kosovo and cooperating on international crimes, crimes against humanity and war crimes cases, there cannot really be justice for war crimes in Kosovo. That is how I see Kosovo’s future. This court is counting its days. It does not have longevity, especially after it finishes the big case.

Janet Anderson 00:45:30  And what about Amer? Whether he thinks the KSC has actually done anything for justice in Kosovo more broadly. Whether he thinks this kind of counting of numbers between Serbian and Kosovan convictions is really the best measure of justice served. I’m not sure it is, but it is clearly an important metric in Kosovo. We asked him too.

Amer Alija 00:45:58  Can this court contribute to justice generally? I think this is only a small contribution to justice for the victims. If we look at the number of victims in these indictments, there are about 100 and some more participating in the cases. But overall we have more than 10,000 civilian victims from the war in Kosovo. Criminal justice is always limited, and it will remain limited. We do not have a perfect system that can find all guilty people or all superiors involved in crimes in any war, whether in Yugoslavia or elsewhere.

Amer Alija 00:46:50 In this process, political will plays a crucial role. For example, we do not have good political cooperation between Kosovo institutions and Serbian institutions. Many suspected people live freely in Serbia and are not extradited to Kosovo for trial. For that reason, Kosovo recently changed its law and started conducting trials in absentia. These are not perfect trials, and they are challenging for institutions, but without political will and diplomatic pressure, no institution will succeed.

Janet Anderson 00:47:46  Amer speaks of 10,000 victims, and just to clarify, those are civilian victims of the war in Kosovo, regardless of ethnicity. I also asked him, because he was very clear that criminal justice is not the only thing, and maybe not even the main thing, in transitional justice: what else is needed in Kosovo? What would real transitional justice require?

Amer Alija 00:48:17  Societies and countries in the region have to work in all fields of transitional justice, not only criminal justice. First of all, they need regional cooperation. They need to accept the victims, share information, find the missing persons, and exchange information that helps indict all the people involved in crimes. It is not enough that only 74 people have been convicted for thousands of victims killed during the war. We also need to cooperate in education, to work more with youth so that what happened is not forgotten, and to change school curricula so that young people do not learn the wrong information but learn what really happened. People with blood on their hands should not be seen as heroes. We need a louder voice for justice for victims.

Janet Anderson 00:49:29  And what about the idea of history-making? When we’ve dropped into court together, often with young journalists learning how to cover war crimes trials, we’ve heard again and again that the Thaçi and others trial is about writing history from both sides.

Margherita Capacci 00:49:58  Yes, history and rewriting history came up many times in the closing statements. The prosecution mentioned it, the defence mentioned it, obviously in opposite ways, and I think most of the accused mentioned it too when they addressed the court. Others I interviewed said it was a point raised over and over again in the closings.

Janet Anderson 00:50:25  It’s fascinating that this becomes one of the major recurring themes. It shows how important this court is to how Kosovo sees itself and the kind of country it wants to be. But is a court really the best method for doing that? Can this court truly contribute to understanding history? Here’s Amer again.

Amer Alija 00:50:54  Court judgments are good sources for history, or at least one of the main sources for writing history. But history cannot be changed because it is not written only through a few judgments delivered by some court. There are many crimes and wars that never even reach investigation or trial, but history still exists. The narrative in Kosovo about what happened during the war is documented very well, even by NGOs and other institutions working on documentation. Trials can contribute to that history and those narratives. But verdicts cannot change the narrative or the history, because verdicts deal only with individual criminal responsibility.

Janet Anderson 00:51:58 That feels true of so many trials I’ve covered. They absorb huge chunks of history, often with historians testifying, and they do write up parts of history in their judgments. But it can never be the full picture because the whole thing is refracted through the trial of a specific person, through the lens of individual criminal responsibility.

Janet Anderson 00:52:34  So, Margherita, this is a gargantuan podcast to match a gigantic trial. Is there anything more we need to say?

Margherita Capacci 00:52:41  I just want to add one thing. I asked Amer, because he raised many issues about this court, as every court has its own issues, whether there was also anything more positive to say.

Amer Alija 00:53:12  The judges involved in these cases are doing their job. They will decide based on the evidence they have. Even if one or two facts are proven by the court, I think that is positive. But it is not positive to have a one-sided court, because that is not good for jurisprudence or for history. Still, we know these courts are ad hoc and they work only for a limited time. Any judgment supported by credible witnesses, testimony and evidence is a positive.

Janet Anderson 00:53:56  Great. I’m sure we’ll be back to do a broader assessment of the KSC, probably without all the pesky details of exactly what happened in the trials. But we’ve managed to shoehorn a lot into this episode, and I think it helps people understand that, as journalists, we are trying both to cover the details of the trials and to understand the bigger picture. So thank you so much, Margherita, for putting this all together. And of course, get well soon to Steph, if you’re listening, wherever you are. We can’t wait to have you back on the podcast.

Margherita Capacci 00:54:40  Thank you, Janet, for having me.

Janet Anderson 00:54:47 And thanks everyone for listening. If you’re enjoying this podcast and would like to give us a bit of extra support, you can head over to our supporters page and leave a tip, or follow us on Patreon, or download our newsletter. We really appreciate everyone who gives us a bit of extra support there.

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This was Asymmetrical Haircuts, your international justice podcast, created and presented by Janet Anderson and Stephanie van den Berg, in partnership with the Hague Humanity Hub. Music is by Audionautix.com. You can find show notes and everything about the podcast on asymmetricalhaircuts.com. This show is available on every major podcast service, so please subscribe, give us a rating, and spread the word.